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I. INTRODUCTION
The Slovak Republic is a microcosm of the political and economic
transformations occurring in Central and Eastern Europe following the
1989 collapse of the Soviet Union.' Although the change of political
systems in the region occurred quite rapidly, it is clear that democratic
states are not born overnight. Slovakia's tribulations underscore the stark
choices that confront states of the former Soviet Block: whether to head
down the difficult route of building a capitalist democracy or return to
Soviet-style principles of a command economy and central political
control. As the former communist countries evolve socially, politically,
economically and legally, these challenges are coupled with international
scrutiny of each state's domestic affairs. The prospect of accession into
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has forced former Soviet states to forego sovereign prerogatives
and make way for increasing international influences and directives.
Torn between adopting western norms and adhering to familiar
comforts of the past, the Slovak government has been much more reluctant
than its Czech counterpart to adopt a system of pragmatic capitalism and to
decentralize state administration.' The ruling coalition government, headed
by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, has sent conflicting signals to Western
officials regarding the state's aspirations to intergrate into the EU and
NATO. The government's general commitment to democratic values has
also been questioned.
The presence of a substantial Hungarian minority in Slovakia
serves as a present day reminder of historical territorial disputes between
1. The names Slovak Republic and Slovakia are used interchangeably throughout this
document and refer to the same entity.
2. References to the Slovak government are to the ruling governmental coalition, not the
president. The government is comprised of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, a populist
party headed by Prime Minister Meciar, the Slovak National Party, a nationalist party, and the
Association for Slovak Workers, a party largely representing communist adherents. The Slovak
President is Mr. Michal Kovac. See also SLOVAK. CONST., ch. 2, pt. VI, art. 108.
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the republics of Slovakia and Hungary.' The Treaty of Trianon, which left
a substantial number of ethnic Hungarians on the Czecho-Slovak side of
the Danube River, is debated within the political arena as if it were written
in 1990, not 1920. Misrepresentation of history and the impoverishment
of political life have resulted in a civil society where ethnic politics are at
the forefront of the national consciousness. The Slovak government has
effectively defined Slovak national culture predominantly along ethnic
lines. Doctrinal and policy debates have incorporated powerful nationalist
interests and, as a result, such concerns are reflected in government policy.
One of the three parties comprising the government coalition is manifestly
nationalistic and it has had a disproportionate influence on government
policy since the legislative elections in the fall of 1994. This nationalist
force is a source of many measures aimed directly at reinforcing the
Slovak nation in Slovakia, often to the detriment of ethnic minorities.
It is premature to characterize the current legal position of the
Hungarian minority as an emergency. Yet, given Slovakia's unproven
economy and unstable political scene, the potential for the eruption of
ethnic tensions between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority is
clear., In the three years since the birth of the Slovak Republic, policies
and practices unbecoming of a democratic and ambitious Central European
state have surfaced. The legislative measures analyzed in this document
have aroused strong emotions and constitute a potential cause for conflict
among Slovak and Hungarian citizens, as well as between the Slovak
Republic and the Republic of Hungary. Ethnic Hungarians perceive their
language and culture as being under attack by the Slovak government.
Surveys reveal that a significant number of Slovak citizens fear the
3. For simplicity, the terms ethnic Hungarians and Hungarian minority are used
interchangeably to refer to Slovak citizens of Hungarian origin. Where the term Hungarians
refers to Hungarian citizens living in Hungary, this will be made clear in the text. The issues
presented in this report are of equal importance to the numerous other minorities within the
Slovak Republic, as the principles involved are general and universal. The emphasis,
nevertheless, is on the Hungarian minority. This focus is in accordance with the current political
climate where the issue of minority rights is equivalent to the question of rights for ethnic
Hungarians. All other minorities are either well off or poorly organized and geographically
dispersed. An example of the first is the Ukrainian minority. An example of the second is the
Roma minority.
4. Surveys used for this report are the following: RASIZMUS, XENOPHOBIA,
ANTISEMITISMUS, A INTOLERENCIA VEDOMI OBYVATELOW SLOVENSKJ REPUBLIKY [RACISM,
XENOPHOBIA, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND INTOLERANCE IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC], Statisticky urad
Slovenskej Republiky, Bratislava (Mar. 1995)[hereinafter RASIZMUS, XENOPHOBIA, etc.];
AUGUSTIN MAROK ET AT., SLOVAK-MAGYAR RELATIONS (1995); Sandor Marai Foundation &
the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Selected Issues Viewed by Slovaks and Hungarians
Living in Ethnically Mixed Regions of Southern Slovakia, Bratislava (July 1994); PETER HUNCIK,
ET AL., COUNTERPROOF (1994); PAVOL FRIC ET AL., THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN
SLOVAKIA (1993).
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outbreak of violence similar to that experienced in the former Yugoslavia.
Ethnic tensions have dramatically heightened since 1993, with incidents of
intimidation, verbal threats, and harassment of ethnic Hungarians
increasing in frequency.
The purpose of this study is to assess whether the Slovak
government is creating or aggravating a climate that is inimical to the
Hungarian minority. This atmosphere may actually be conducive to an
ethnic conflict or refugee situation. For this report, international
agreements and standards are used to evaluate the situation. No lower
standard than those set by the international community should be accepted
in the Slovak Republic.
II. THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
The historical presence of Hungarians in what is now recognized
as the Slovak sovereign state has strongly influenced present relations
between the Slovak majority and the ethnic Hungarian minority. The
social status of Hungarians in Slovakia's southern region has drastically
shifted with the relocation of Hungary's northern border. Tracing the
Hungarian presence over the years reveals that Hungarians formed part of
the Hungarian Empire until 1918; constituted an ethnic minority in
Czechoslovakia through the 1920s and 1930s; and comprised part of a
majority group during the Hungarian occupation of southern Slovakia
between 1938-1945. After World War II, Hungarians were either forced
from the territory of Czechoslovakia or remained within the state and
experienced severe discrimination for their affiliation with a foreign power
during the war years. Historical factors that led to ethnic and geographic
borders that do not correlate continue to serve as the impetus for conflict
between ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians living in Slovakia. Mr. Gyozo
Bauer, President of the Hungarian cultural organization, CSEMADOK,
added:
[m]y father never moved from Samorin [a predominantly
Hungarian town located in the south-west of Slovakia], but
he lived in five countries due to border changes. No one
asked him in his whole life which country he wanted to
live in. No one has asked us to this day. It is not my
decision and I have no power to change it. I do not wish
to change it. All we want is the power to keep our
community and our culture alive.,
5. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of the Hungarian cultural organization,
CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 16, 1996).
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The historical volatility in the region has greatly contributed to shaping
domestic legislative decisions and foreign policy choices of the government
coalition ruling Slovakia today.
A. The History of Hungarians in the Slovak Republic
A brief historical discussion of the region is necessary in order to
understand present day ethnic relations in Slovakia. Hungarians, who call
themselves Magyars, arrived in Central Europe in the ninth century as one
of many tribes from Asia, and they settled on the plains of Central and
Eastern Europe.6  The Hungarians adopted Catholicism around the
beginning of the twelfth century and founded a kingdom with frontiers that
were to remain largely unmodified until 1918. The Hungarian Kingdom
encompassed what is now recognized as Slovakia, which was then referred
to as Upper Hungary. Slovaks, who had arrived in the region in the fourth
and fifth centuries A.D., were subjects of the Hungarian Kingdom for
centuries who were ruled by a predominantly Hungarian nobility. When
the Ottoman Empire included large parts of Hungary, the Hungarian
capital was moved to Bratislava, then called Pozsony, and ethnically
dominated by Hungarians., By the end of the nineteenth century, Slovaks
were essentially an illiterate and impoverished people. Ethnic Slovaks
were underrepresented in government and plagued by Magyarization, the
Hungarian government's plan to force the assimilation of ethnic Slovaks
into Hungarian society. Economic life was dominated by ethnic Germans
and Jews while political life was dominated by Hungarians.
During the twentieth century, Slovakia's southern region was
governed by numerous sovereigns, including the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, the independent Czechoslovak state, the Socialist Republic of
Czechoslovakia, and the independent Slovak state. On October 28, 1918,
the first Czechoslovak Republic was established. The Treaty of Trianon
on June 4, 1920, designated the southern border of Czechoslovakia.
Strategic and economic considerations led to a border set partly to coincide
with the Danube River, creating a significant Hungarian minority within
the new state.9 In 1938, the Vienna Arbitration Accords again attributed
the southern part of Slovakia to Hungary. In 1939, Slovak leaders
proclaimed an independent Slovak state. During World War II, Slovakia
was under fascist rule, resulting in the Slovak National Uprising against
6. MAROK ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
7. Id. at 6.
8. In 1914, 27% of Slovaks were illiterate compared with three percent of Czechs. See
ANDRt & JEAN SELLIER, ATLAS DES PEUPLES DE LEUROPE CENTRALE (1993).
9. This border was not officially recognized by Hungary until the bilateral friendship
treaty between Hungary and Slovakia was ratified in 1996.
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Nazi forces in August 1944. After World War II, Czechoslovakia was
recreated in the shape of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia (CSSR)
to include the Hungarian dominated territory, again partly delineated by
the Danube. Following the Prague Spring uprising against the communist
regime in 1968, Hungarian troops were among the Soviet forces that
entered the CSSR to suppress the rebellion. Some ethnic Hungarian
inhabitants welcomed the Hungarian troops as liberators.
In 1990, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) were
formed to the displeasure of Slovak nationalists who hoped for the creation
of an independent Slovak state. In 1992, Slovak nationalists won the
parliamentary elections and voted to secede from the CSFR. They formed
the Slovak Republic now in existence. Resistance to secession existed
primarily in the Czech Republic and among ethnic Hungarians in the
Slovak Republic.' 0 The current Slovak Republic is still delineated in part
by the Danube, thus including in some regions a population of more than
eighty percent Hungarians. In these regions, Slovaks constitute an ethnic
minority. Since the Velvet Divorce, as the separation of the Slovak and
Czech Republics has been coined, tensions between ethnic Hungarians and
Slovaks have steadily increased in intensity. Mr. Ondrej Dostal, an expert
on minority rights in Slovakia, noted that:
[d]ue to the split with the Czech Republic and thanks to the
cultivated way of division, the Slovak nationalists have lost
their main enemy, which until then used to be Prague.
The nationalist part of the Slovak political scene has then
logically opted for the Hungarian minority and its political
representatives as its new target of confrontation policy
making. . . . Slovakia has entered its first year of
existence with the burden of an unsolved relationship -
[the] relationship with its largest minority."
10. According to one survey, 81% of ethnic Hungarians opined that they would have voted
against separation if a referendum had been held before the division of the CSFR. See FRIC ET
AL., supra note 4, at 77.
11. DOSTAL, OD KONFRONTACIE K REZERVOVANOSTI, QUO VADIS SLOVENSKO 107
(1995).
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B. Recent Developments Concerning the Situation of Ethnic
Hungarians in Slovakia
In the days of socialist rule, Slovaks and Hungarians coexisted
successfully on Slovak territory.' 2 The fall of the communist regime in
Slovakia, however, sounded the reveille for historic inter-ethnic prejudices.
In light of possible EU and NATO integration, the Slovak government
must develop lasting cooperation with its neighbors as part of the European
Stability Pact. Nationalist politics, however, continue to strain bilateral
relations between the republics of Hungary and Slovakia, thereby
jeopardizing the possibility of western amalgamation.
1. Relations Between Ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia
Hungarians in Slovakia number approximately 600,000,
constituting 11.5% of the population." Hungarians comprise the ethnic
majority in 437 towns and, in another eighty-five communities, they
comprise ten to fifty percent of the population."1 These 522 settlements
form a compact area running along the southern border of the Slovak
Republic, where ninety-eight percent of the Hungarian population in
Slovakia live.' In this area, an average of seventy percent of the local
population is Hungarian.' 6
Surveys show that Hungarians in Slovakia are universally
perceived as a distinct group with a common language, culture, values, and
political interests.' 7 Hungarian political parties generally gather nearly one
hundred percent of the votes of ethnic Hungarians. In issues where ethnic
Hungarians' interests are at stake, the Hungarian vote is practically
unanimous. Over eighty percent of ethnic Hungarians believe that there
should be bilingual road signs. Ninety percent think that both the
Hungarian and Slovak languages should be used in administration. Sixty
percent are in favor of some kind of cultural autonomy. Among Slovaks,
on the other hand, the majority is generally against these proposals.
Sympathy among Slovaks for Hungarian claims is greater in southern
Slovakia (in the ethnically commingled areas) than in northern Slovakia.
Alternative schools, those including instruction in both the Slovak and
12. One survey indicates that this period was the one with the best relations between
Slovaks and Hungarians. Approximately 40% of Slovaks and 20% of Hungarians expressed this
opinion. See PETER HUNCIK ET AL., COUNTERPROOF (1994).
13. Statement Issued on the Occasion of the Hungarian Convention in Komarno (Jan. 4,
1994). These figures are based on the 1991 Slovak census.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See generally supra note 4.
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Hungarian languages, are considered useless by fifty percent of the
Hungarians but useful by sixty percent of Slovaks. Openness for a
neighbor of the opposite ethnicity is also greater in the south than in the
north. Two percent of Hungarians and fifteen percent of Slovaks are
opposed to this prospect.18 While in the north, twenty-six percent of
Slovaks would dislike having a Hungarian neighbor.' 9
The forecast for future relations varies. According to one survey,
more than sixty percent of the population opine that Hungarians and
Slovaks will continue to coexist well in Slovakia. According to another
study, however, more than forty percent of either nationality think
relations may short-circuit into violence similar to that in the former
Yugoslavian territory." Even among those who believe that relations
between the two ethnic groups are presently good, more than thirty percent
expressed such fears. 2 According to a government survey, fifty percent of
respondents perceived Hungarians as the greatest threat to the Slovak
Republic.Y Some of the reasons stated for this perception were that the
Hungarian nature comprises the traits of "desire to rule," "eternal
restlessness," "inability to live in peace with other nations," "do not
respect Slovakia," "hate Slovakia," and "want more rights than Slovaks." 23
Ethnic Hungarians were accused of wanting "a greater Hungary" and of
threatening "[Slovak] sovereignty and territory."2' Others stated that "they
want to Magyarize Slovaks," "they want to break away," "they have
territorial ambitions," "they provoke unrest," "they are ruining good
relations," "they don't recognize tolerance," and "I don't trust them."25
The Slovak government continues to harbor suspicions of
Hungarian territorial claims to Slovakia's southern region. "They would
like to have [the territory of southern Slovakia] back, that's for sure,"
asserted Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National
Minorities at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "It is the official
policy of Hungary to support [ethnic Hungarian] autonomy in neighboring
countries, and to then have these areas hold a referendum on succession to
Hungary to complete reunification to the motherland. It definitely
18. FRIC ET AL., supra note 4, at 73.
19. Id.
20. HUNCIK ET AL., supra note 4.
21. Id.
22. RASIZMUS, XENOPHIOBIA, etc., supra note 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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[constitutes] a destabilizing factor in Europe. "2 The fear of Hungarian
territorial aggression is deeply imbedded in Slovak consciousness and the
Slovak government has successfully perpetuated this fear among its
citizenry.2 7 According to a 1994 survey, forty-two percent of citizens of
Slovak nationality suspect that the "hidden goal of members of the
Hungarian minority is a change of borders and annexation of southern
areas of Slovakia to Hungary."s In a July 1996 poll, thirty percent of
Slovaks agreed with the assertion that the Hungarian minority supports the
reunification of Slovakia's southern region with Hungary, while sixty-three
percent of Hungarians disagreed with this statement. 29 This survey reflects
the feeling among Slovaks that ethnic Hungarians are not loyal to the
Slovak state. This is a difficult accusation to disprove. "I live according
to the Slovak Constitution. I work here and pay my taxes. I do nothing
against the Slovak government. So, what is the problem? That I speak
Hungarian? The question of loyalty isn't proven because I don't cry at the
Slovak national anthem," asserts Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of the
Hungarian cultural organization, CSEMADOK.30  Mr. Bela Bugar,
Chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (MKDH), echoed
this sentiment. He asserted that the Slovak government "does not say love
your country, but love your state. For me, this is ridiculous. I can love a
country but I cannot love a state.""
Despite this antagonistic and distrustful atmosphere, violent
outbreaks between ethnic Hungarians and Slovaks have been minimal. The
most notable incident occurred on May 5, 1996, when a hand grenade
exploded outside of the home of Mr. Bugar, a leading member of the
26. Interview with Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National Minorities
Division, Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
27. It should be noted, however, that Hungarian calls for autonomy in the southern region
of Slovakia have resulted in increased skepticism among the Slovak public. The Hungarian
political party, Coexistence, has been the most vocal proponent of territorial autonomy. Perhaps
as a result, Coexistence Chairman, Miklos Duray, was found to be the most unpopular politician
in Slovakia by a January 1996 poll, gathering sixty-four percent of the most negative responses.
See Sharon Fisher, 13 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Jan. 18, 1996) (visited Oct. 27, 1997)
< http://www.omri. CZ/ publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
28. FOCUS AGENCY, ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF SLOVAKIA: REPORT FROM SOCIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH (Dec. 1994).
29. Dana Soucova, V Obciach Juzneho Slovenska Wadnu Dobre Vzt'ahy, Avsak Tretina
Obyvatel'ov sa Obava Konfliktu [Citizens in Southern Slovakia Perceive a Good Relationship,
However One-Third of Inhabitants Fear a Conflict]; See generally NARODNA OBRODA, July 17,
1996, at 5.
30. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996).
31. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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ethnic Hungarian opposition to the Slovak government. Responsibility for
the bombing has yet to be determined. 32 A previous violent attack occurred
in May 1995 after a soccer match in northern Slovakia. Several ethnic
Hungarians were thrown from a train while traveling home after the
match. 33  Intimidation, threats, and harassment of members of the
Hungarian minority are common. Many ethnic Hungarians are afraid to
speak Hungarian in public when visiting northern areas of Slovakia for fear
of reprisal. At the Hungarian-language high school in the capital city of
Bratislava, attending students complain that they are frequently harassed on
the street when speaking Hungarian. As one student noted:
Once my classmates and I were walking down Obchodna
Ulica [Shop Street] and we were all speaking Hungarian.
Four boys approached us and one of them slapped my
classmate and told her to stop speaking Hungarian. I was
very frightened. I have heard so many stories from
[Hungarian] friends who have been pushed or punched in
public because they were speaking Hungarian.
Sometimes when I walk to school from the bus station with
a friend, people will shout 'Na Slovensku, po Slovensky!
[In Slovakia, in Slovak!]' at us."
Other common nationalist slogans include "Mad'ari za Dunaj! [Hungarians
to the Other Side of the Danube River!]" and "Jete Slovensky Chlieb!
[You Eat Slovak Bread!]," which implies that if one reaps the benefits
from residing in Slovakia, such as consuming its agricultural goods, one
should not complain about conditions within the state. Dislike of the
Hungarian minority is generally higher among Slovak citizens living in the
northern region of Slovakia where contact with members of the minority
group is minimal.3 Relations between Slovaks and Hungarians in the
ethnically commingled areas of southern Slovakia are reportedly less
antagonistic. One ethnic Hungarian observed:
In Samorin [a small town approximately twenty kilometers
from Bratislava], where approximately thirty percent of the
population is Slovak and seventy percent of the population
is Hungarian, there are no problems or conflicts between
us. The conflicts are mainly political. Political rhetoric
32. See generally NARODONA OBRODA, May 6, 1996.
33. UNITED STATES DEPT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 13 (1995).
34. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian student, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 12, 1996).
35. See generally HUNCIK ET AL., supra note 4; PAVOL FRIC ET AL., supra note 4, at 76-
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causes people who do not know any ethnic Hungarians to
believe what government officials say about us - that we
all want to return to Hungary and that we hate Slovaks.
These accusations are not true. In Slovakia, like
everywhere, there are extremists on both sides. Luckily
this is only a small percentage.36
In the years following the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics,
nationalist forces have played an increasing role in Slovak politics. In the
fall 1994 elections, seven parties or coalitions of parties won seats, but no
party or coalition gained a clear majority. This forced the movement for a
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), a populist party headed by Prime Minister
Meciar, to form a coalition government with the Slovak National Party
(SNS), a nationalist party. As a result, government policy has been
heavily influenced by the SNS over the past two years." Nationalist views
have been conducive or even instrumental in formulating most of the
government measures passed by the National Council of the Slovak
Republic (Slovak Parliament) in recent months, which seek to assimilate
the Hungarian minority. Nationalist political forces have constructed a
watershed between ethnic Hungarian parties and ethnic Slovak parties so
that the most important political issue has become ethnicity, rather than
concrete issues.,8 Extreme solutions to the problems confronting ethnic
Hungarians have been suggested, such as: Hungarians should leave
Slovakia, they should assimilate into the Slovak nation, or Slovaks in
southern Slovakia should assimilate with Hungarians. All of these
proposals fail to get widespread support, as more than sixty percent of
either nationality opposes them.3 9 As one ethnic Hungarian commented:
36. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian resident, in Samorin, Slovakia (June 28, 1996).
37. SNS stated on January 4, 1996, that it would like to intensify international
cooperation, and that its first step in this direction would be to prepare a meeting with the
chairman of the neo-Nazi Austrian Freedom Party, Jorg Haider. Pending items on the
legislative agenda of the SNS include the passage of a local election law based on the
"proportional principal according to nationality" and the reevaluation of constitutional Articles 15
(which prohibits the death penalty) and 34 (which articulates the rights of ethnic minorities).
Sharon Fisher, Slovak Coalition Party to Initiate Constitutional Changes, 141 OMRI DAILY DIG.
II (July 23, 1996)(last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
38. An example of how the fear of Hungarian expansion can be used as an argument
against all kinds of international cooperation is the Carpathian Euroregion project of 1994. A
number of regions in northern Slovakia wanted to cooperate with similar regions in other
countries to the north of Slovakia. This was rejected by the government as a step toward a
Hungarian takeover of the southern regions. By rejecting this project, the government prevented
decentralization.
39. See generally supra note 4, for a list of surveys, which support this position.
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[Prime Minister] Meciar often says: 'Those who do not
like it here in Slovakia should leave.' Nobody can tell us
to leave this land because we were born here, our parents
were born here, our grandparents, et cetera. My family
has been living on this land for 1100 years. Personally, I
am not the type of person who could leave and start a new
life somewhere else. I had a chance to leave in 1968, but I
decided to stay. I am a local patriot. I will never leave
here no matter how badly I am treated by my
government.40
Nationalist rhetoric and the implementation of domestic legislation
that negatively affects the Hungarian minority has produced distrust of the
government among ethnic Hungarians. An ethnic Hungarian resident of
Dunajska Streda admitted:
We should have trust in our government, but we don't.
How can we when so many new laws, like the State
Language Law and the Law on Territorial Division, are
passed which are one hundred percent targeted directly
against us. It is nearly impossible for a Hungarian
delegate in Parliament to pass a bill that attempts to
guarantee our rights. So, this is not really a democracy.
HZDS and SNS have their people everywhere, in all the
decision making positions. This makes our voice silent.'
In response, the Slovak government denies allegations that recently
promulgated legislation negatively affects national minorities. Mr.
Branislav Lichardus, Slovak Ambassador to the United States, denied
alleged ill-effects of the State Language Law, discussed infra, and stated
that minority rights in Slovakia were among the highest in Europe. Mr.
Lichardus noted that [ethnic Hungarians] can speak their own language,
elect their own leaders, attend their own schools, read their own
newspapers and attend their own cultural activities.42
Following the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics, ethnic
Hungarians have become politically organized. Ethnic Hungarians are
represented by three political parties in Slovakia: Coexistence, MKDH,
and the Hungarian Civic Party. The parliamentary elections in June 1990
marked the entry of ethnic Hungarian parties into political representation.
40. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian citizen, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 28, 1996).
41. Interview conducted with an ethnic Hungarian citizen, in Dunajska Streda, Slovakia
(July 19, 1996).
42. Branislav Lichardus, Editorial, Slovakia's Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at
[Vol. 4:27
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During the 1994 elections, the three Hungarian parties joined forces,
forming a broad coalition and gaining 10.18% of the vote and seventeen
seats in Parliament.'3 The legal demands of the Hungarian coalition are
articulated in the Komarno Agreement, a document written as the result of
the controversial meeting of Hungarian representatives in the southern city
of Komarno in 1994. "The Komarno Agreement states the clear legal
demands of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, ranging from local self-
government to education. The Slovak government has largely ignored
these demands and refuses to address the draft legislation proposed by the
Hungarian coalition on these issues," asserts Mr. Bela Bugar of MKDH.
"We would need a different government to achieve any of the goals of this
document. ""
Cooperation and communication between HZDS and the
Hungarian coalition is minimal .' The Slovak government has limited
tolerance for political opposition among both Slovaks and Hungarians, and
has utilized a variety of measures aimed at stifling dissent. In a July 1996
interview with the Hungarian newspaper, Uj Szo, Mr. Dusan Slobodnik of
the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that the Slovak government
had the right to prohibit the existence of the Hungarian Coalition because
individual Hungarian -parties could form coalitions with other Slovak
opposition groups."6 A majority of legislation drafted by the Hungarian
coalition is ignored and never addressed in Parliament. Mr. Bugar added:
The government takes into consideration the demands of
the Hungarian coalition and they listen to them only as
much as the Council of Europe and other international
bodies are able to force them to listen. The demarches
[concerning the observance of democratic principles] sent
by the European Union and the United States had some
results, but as long as the current government continues to
maintain the same mind set, it is very difficult to get them
to understand democratic rules. This is why we continue to
need directives from [the West] .41
43. In Slovakia, coalitions of two or more parties must receive at least seven percent of the
vote to gain parliamentary representation.
44. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
45. The same is true of Slovak opposition parties and HZDS.
46. Gabriella Horvath, Ner Masodrendu Allampolgarok a Szlovakiaban elo Magyarok
[Hungarians Living in Slovakia Are Not Second-Class Citizens], UJ SZO, July 17,1996, at 1, 6.
(Julia Domsitz trans).
47. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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Opposition members of Parliament are not represented on parliamentary
committees, a phenomenon that prompted the EU to issue a demarche to
the Slovak government in 1995. The European Parliament noted, inter
alia, its concern that "opposition parties represented in the Slovak
[Parliament] are not properly represented in the leading bodies of the
Parliament, as is sound democratic practice in all the Member states of the
European Union and in other countries with democratic traditions." 8 Mr.
Bugar noted:
In a normal parliamentary democracy, there would be a
proportional representation in the parliamentary
committees. For example, the Hungarian coalition
comprises approximately ten percent of Parliament,
therefore, we should make up ten percent of the
parliamentary committees and should hold positions within
these committees .... There is not a single vice-chairman
or chairman on any parliamentary committee from the
opposition. What's more, sometimes a certain party, like
the Hungarian coalition, cannot participate during
negotiations within a committee. For example, the
Security Committee has no Hungarian member. This is
also true of the Television Committee, the Radio
Committee, and the Secret Service Committee.4 9
After pledging to appoint a Hungarian coalition member to the Special
Supervisory Bureau of the Slovak Intelligence Service, Mr. Arpad Matejka
of HZDS said that MKDH Chairman, Bela Bugar, and Coexistence
Chairman, Miklos Duray, were unacceptable candidates because HZDS
holds them responsible for misleading statements made abroad. °
Substantial changes have not yet been made in the composition of
parliamentary committees with regard to adequate representation of
opposition members, despite the urging of numerous Western officials.
The Slovak government is engaged in a struggle not only over the
extent to which minority rights should be granted, but also over the
adoption of basic democratic governing principles. Mr. Laszlo Ollos of
Hungarian Civic Party stated:
48. The European Parliament, Resolution on the need to respect human and democratic
rights in the Slovak Republic. EUR. PARL. DOC. (D) (Nov. 16, 1995).
49. Id.
50. Hungarian Coalition Representatives Meet With HZDS, DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR,
June 28, 1996, at 5. See also Joe Cook, Slovak Law Threatens Hunan Rights, GUARDIAN, Apr.
12, 1996, at 013.
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Here in Slovakia, there are not left/right parties. There's
democratic and anti-democratic parties. There is a
constitutional struggle over what type of political system
we want as a nation and, to make things more difficult,
there is a large national minority. Slovakia is located in an
important geopolitical position, yet the people have a low
level of political culture given that we have had little
history of a civil political climate. This is a period of
Enlightenment here. It is the first influx of Western ideas,
culture, political and economic philosophies.,,
The EU and the United States have repeatedly urged the Slovak
government to put greater emphasis on the toleration of diverse opinions
and full support for constitutional rights. Democratic progress and free-
market transformation are vital to the acceptance of Slovakia into the trans-
Atlantic community and other Western institutions.
Discussion of ethnic Hungarian rights frequently returns to a
revision of historic events that have scarred the memories of members of
the Slovak government. When confronted with a question about the use of
the Hungarian language or access to Hungarian language education in
Slovakia, Slovak government officials often reframe the issue as one of
ethnic Slovak rights in Hungary. This sentiment is revealed upon the
expression of dissent or discontentment among ethnic Hungarians. "We
must not forget the forced assimilation of Slovaks into Hungarian society.
There were 400,000 ethnic Slovaks in Hungary at one time. Now there
are only 110,000. There is only one school for Slovaks in Hungary.
There is no reciprocity," commented Mr. Juraj Zervan of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. 2 Evidence of the Hungarian government's mistreatment
of the Slovak minority is used to justify the Slovak government's own
assimilationist policies toward the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Mr.
Slobodnik evidenced this assumption in a recent newspaper interview:
If Hungary would treat their minorities better and won't
assimilate them as they did in the 1920s and 1930s and will
apologize for this activity, we can discuss the issue of our
[official language policy] with them. . . . There are no
Hungarians in Slovakia that have been assimilated in
southern Slovakia. 33
51. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Ollos, Hungarian Civic Party member and Professor of
Philosophy at the Nitra Pedagogical College, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 23, 1996).
52. Interview with Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National Minorities
Division, Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
53. Horvath, supra note 46.
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2. The Relationship Between the Slovak Republic and the Republic
of Hungary
Hungarian and Slovak history places a strain on present relations
between the two states. The end of communism revived historic
animosities between the two neighbors, and ethnic politics have taken
center stage. As stabilization of bilateral relations is a prerequisite to entry
into both the EU and NATO, the two states have attempted to appease
Western officials by entering into a friendship treaty. Historic tensions,
however, have not subsided with ratification of the treaty, and ethnic
politics continue to dominate relations between Slovakia and Hungary.
The issue of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System continues
to strain the tenuous cooperation established between the two governments
over the past three years. A treaty was signed on September 16, 1977
between the People's Republic of Hungary and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic to jointly construct a dam and barrage systems on these two
locations.' In the late eighties, Hungary suspended construction at
Nagymaros primarily on economic grounds.55 In chronological order,
CSSR, the CSFR and the Slovak Republic unilaterally pursued the
construction and operation of the systems. On May 19, 1992, Hungary
officially terminated the treaty. The termination was partly due to
ecological and environmental considerations. ' In addition, the Hungarian
government's decision to withdraw from the agreement was influenced by
the fact that large numbers of ethnic Hungarians on the Slovak side of the
Danube River would be displaced by construction of the project." A
breach of contract claim is currently pending before the International Court
of Justice and will be heard in February 1997 unless the two countries
reach an out of court settlement. In the three rounds of negotiations to
date, the two states have not come any closer to reaching an equitable
settlement.5
Between 1990 and 1992, a nationalist regime in the Republic of
Hungary prevented closer bilateral contact,59 and from 1992 onward,
54. See generally Treaty on the Construction and Joint Operation of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Barrage System, Sept. 16, 1977, Hungarian People's Republic - Socialist Republic
of Czech.
55. MAROK ET AL., supra note 4, at 70.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Sharon Fisher, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria Deepen Ties, 214 OMRI DAILY DIG. II
(Nov. 5, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml>.
59. The Hungarian Prime Minister during this period, Mr. Jozsef Antall, claimed that he
considered himself the Prime Minister of fifteen million Hungarians, five million more than live
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Slovak Prime Minister Meciar was reluctant to negotiate. Tensions
between the two states heightened again in 1993 when Slovakia applied for
membership to the Council of Europe. Hungary threatened to veto
Slovakia's membership in the-Council of Europe, noting that Slovakia had
not ratified several international documents aimed at the protection of
national minorities. Due to pressure from the EU countries and pledges
from the Slovak government that such legislation would be passed,
Hungarian representatives abstained from the vote.60
In April 1994, interim Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik met with his
Hungarian counterpart at the border towns of Komarno and Komarom to
discuss bilateral issues. At this meeting, it was decided that a joint
committee should be set up to identify Slovak-Hungarian bilateral
problems. Drafting of a treaty commenced, resulting in the Slovak-
Hungarian Basic Treaty (SHBT).6' In the treaty, Hungary wanted
guarantees providing for Hungarian minority rights in Slovakia, and
Slovakia sought confirmation of the inviolability of its borders.
After extensive negotiations, Prime Ministers Meciar and Gyula
Horn signed the SHBT on March 19, 1995. Although the Hungarian
Parliament ratified the treaty on June 13, 1995, the Slovak Parliament
repeatedly delayed ratification of the bilateral treaty until March 26,
1996.62 In order to gain sufficient support for the SHBT in the Slovak
Parliament, Prime Minister Meciar's HZDS party succumbed to the
demands of the far-right SNS. The SNS insisted that, in return for the
party's support, a package of hard-line legislation concerning anti-
subversion measures, states of emergency, local elections, and education
would quickly be addressed by the Slovak Parliament. Indeed, shortly
before passage of the SHBT, the Slovak Parliament adopted the Law on the
within the territorial boundaries of Hungary. This prompted outrage from the governments of
both Romania and Slovakia and perpetuated distrust and fear of Hungarian territorial aggression.
See Barry Newman, How to Tether Centuries-Old Hatreds, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1995, at A7.
60. Slovakia became a member of the Council of Europe on June 30, 1993. On January
30, 1996, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, accusing the Council of Europe of using a
double standard in evaluating human rights standards, requested that the Council of Europe apply
the same standard when evaluating the situation of ethnic minorities in a new or established
member country. Slovak Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Gasparovic proposed that the Council of
Europe's Parliamentary Assembly compile a "White Book" on standard ethnic rights to ensure
that all member nations are monitored with the same objective criteria. See Sharon Fisher,
Slovak Foreign Minister on Council of Europe, 22 OMRI DAILY DIG., II, No. 22 (Jan. 31, 1996)
(last visited Oct. 28, 1997) < http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
61. Zmluva o dobrom susedstve a priatel'skej spolupraci medzi Slovenskou republikou a
Mad'arskou republikou [Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the
Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary], Mar. 18, 1995, Slovak Republic - Republic of
Hung (visited Oct. 17, 1997) < http://law.gonzada.edu/library/ceedocs/slovhvn.htm >.
62. On December 20, 1995, the Slovak Parliament voted to postpone decision until its
January session. On January 30, 1996, ratification was again delayed until March 1996.
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Protection of the Republic. This anti-subversion legislation, reminiscent of
legislation promulgated under the communist regime, provoked a flurry of
international criticism. This action overshadowed the long-awaited SHBT
ratification and, as a result, the bilateral treaty failed to smooth decades of
mistrust and tension between the two states.6 3
In July 1996, a conference in Budapest titled, "Hungarians and
Hungarians Living Abroad," once again illuminated the deep distrust
between the neighboring states. The conference produced a document,
signed by Hungarian officials and representatives of the ethnic Hungarian
minorities in neighboring states, asserted that autonomy is a basic condition
for maintaining the identity of Hungarians beyond Hungary's borders. By
leaving autonomy undefined, the document's ambiguity led to renewed
charges that the Hungarian government was threatening Slovak
sovereignty. Slovak officials interpreted the document as a call for
territorial self-rule in southern Slovakia. SNS members immediately
accused the Hungarian government of "destabilizing the Central European
region" by "supporting minorities' hazardous tendencies toward
autonomy. "6 HZDS parliamentarians sent a written appeal to their
counterparts in Hungary stressing that "Slovakia has had bad historical
experiences from co-existence with Hungarians. In modern times, that was
most pointedly shown between 1938-1945 during the occupation of
southern parts of Slovakia by Hungary. Slovaks on occupied territories
were second-rate citizens, deprived of basic human rights and freedoms. ,,61
Ethnic Hungarian parliamentarians who participated in the conference were
accused of treasonous activity. Mr. Slobodnik of the Slovak Ministry of
Foreign Affairs asserted that the document produced at the conference
spoiled Slovakia's relationship with Hungary and violated the SHBT. Mr.
Slobodnik accused "[tihe five Hungarian minority representatives [who
attended the conference of] commit[ting] a crime by allying themselves
with a foreign power . . . . "66 Ms. Edit Bauer, a parliament member from
the Coexistence party, attended the conference. She was subsequently
63. Some members of the Slovak Parliament wanted ratification of the SHBT conditional
on receiving an apology from Hungary for the occupation of southern Slovakia during World
War II. See generally NARODNA OBRODA, Feb. 8, 1996.
64. SNS Parliamentary Vice-Chairman, Martin Antal, stated that the Budapest conference
was aimed at "causing national disturbances that would ultimately lead to a re-evaluation of
current borders and [was] an effort to resurrect 'Greater Hungary' [in violation of the Treaty of
Trianon]." SNS Wants to Re-Debate Amended Penal Code in Parliament, DAILY NEWS
MONITOR/TASR, July 20, 1996, at 2.
65. The appeal recalled that Hungary has not apologized for Slovak occupation between
1938-1945 and asserted that, given this failure, Slovakia has no assurances that such an event
will recur. Slovak Parliamentarians Appeal to their Counterparts in Hungary, DAILY NEWS
MONITOR/TASR, July 12, 1996, at 2.
66. Horvath, supra note 46.
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accused of treason, and Mr. Slobodnik threatened to remove her
parliamentary immunity from prosecution. 6  Ms. Bauer assessed the
situation as follows:
[The government] used this accusation to frighten and to
threaten us. They know that if you analyze the Budapest
document, you cannot find any evidence of treason ...
They are creating such a hostile environment that people
are becoming afraid to speak their minds in public. We are
returning to the mind set of the communist era where
people can only dissent in private, if at all."
The Hungarian government was quick to respond to Slovak
condemnation of the conference. While asserting that the Budapest
Document had no legal effect and was not intended to cause friction with
neighboring countries, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry denied allegations
that they violated the terms of the SHBT and international legal norms.
"The Slovak reaction [to the Budapest Document] asserts that autonomy
would lead to an ethnically pure region and separatist tendencies which
would have a destabilizing effect on the territory, but other European
examples refute these accusations," said Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, the
Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.69 Nevertheless, the conference
provided fuel for an already burning fire. Instead of offering concrete
suggestions to the discussion of minority rights, the conference served only
to create alarm among those already afraid of alleged Hungarian
irredentism.
The Slovak government has been criticized by political opponents
and other state governments for limiting political discourse both within and
beyond Slovak borders. In a democratic society, individuals have the right
to communicate freely with citizens of another state. In the case of the
Hungarian minority, this is particularly important, as it allows for the
exchange of ideas and information among members of an ethnic group.
The importance of cross-border contacts by members of minority groups
was specifically acknowledged in the SHBT. SHBT Article 12(2) supports
cross-border contact between organizations and individuals. This provision
states that:
67. Slovak Parliament members are granted immunity from prosecution or disciplinary
sanction without the approval of the Slovak Parliament. SLOVK. CONST. Pt. 5, ch. 1, art. 78, §
2.
68. Interview with Ms. Edit Bauer, Slovak Parliamentarian for the Coexistence Party, in
Samorin, Slovakia (July 16, 1996).
69. Laszlo Kovacs, Statement of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry (July 10, 1996)(Ildiko
Domsitz trans).
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[I]n the opinion of the Contracting Parties, the basic form
of co-operation between their countries in the cultural,
scientific and educational fields is co-operation between
institutions, organizations, associations, unions,
municipalities and local governments, the groups
established on the basis of civic initiatives and co-operation
between individuals based on mutual needs and interests.
On the basis of the respective agreements and programs,
they shall promote initiatives of the state, social and
private institutions, organizations and associations and
natural persons serving to advance their mutual knowledge
and to bring them closer to one another. 0
Given the SHBT's binding nature upon the Slovak government, respect for
members of the Hungarian minority to maintain contacts in Hungary
should be supported absent clear and compelling evidence of subversive
activity. Respect for cross-border contact is also supported in the
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM).
Article 17(1) states:
The parties undertake not to interfere with the right of
persons belonging to national minorities to establish and
maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers with
persons lawfully staying in other states, in particular those
with whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or
religious identity, or a common cultural heritage.,,
The Council of Europe's European Charter on Regional or Minority
Languages Article 14(a) also encourages trans-frontier exchanges by
"foster[ing] contacts between the users of the same language in the state
concerned in the fields of culture, education, information, vocational
training and permanent education. ,,
Attendance at a meeting in Hungary where some form of autonomy
was discussed does not per se threaten the territorial integrity of the Slovak
Republic. Accusing ethnic Hungarian parliamentarians who attended the
conference with prosecution for treason hardly serves to foster bilateral
dialogue on minority rights. The governments on both sides of the Danube
70. SLOVAK HUNGARIAN BASIS TREATY, art. 12(2), Mar. 19, 1995, SOS (visited Oct. 27,
1997) < http://www.eanet.sk/medza/95/mar/0036.html >.
71. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES, art.
17(1), Exceprts from The Framework Convention (Report 24 Sept. 1, 1997)
<http://www.Cde.Cu5e/raoul/min-iin.html. > [hereinafter FCNM].
72. European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, 1992 Council of Europe,
Europ. T.S. No. 148.
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violated the spirit of the SHBT, and the conference failed to establish a
constructive platform upon which a reasonable solution to existing ethnic
tensions could be built. Nonetheless, cross-frontier communication should
be encouraged on all levels between governments and individuals in order
to improve transnational relations and cross-cultural understanding.
III. SYSTEM OF MINORITY PROTECTION
During the past three years, Slovakia has struggled to develop a
constitutionally-based legal system. Given its tumultuous history, Slovakia
has little historical guidance to direct its efforts to establish a rule of law
that equally protects each citizen. Furthermore, as a candidate for
membership into both the EU and NATO, Slovakia faces the challenge of
satisfying requirements set by the community of western European states.
Ethnic Hungarians perceive their rights as being under attack by the Slovak
government over the past three years, although the government continues
to assert that Slovakia is one of the most generous states in Europe in terms
of its protection of national minorities. Mr. Slobodnik of the Slovak
Ministry of Foreign Affairs assessed the present situation of the Hungarian
minority as follows:
Slovakia has the highest human rights standard in Europe.
You can't find another country where there are minorities
and they are treated as well as Hungarians are in Slovakia.
Some politicians and journalists from the [Hungarian
Coalition] forget how developed Hungarian schools are
here in Slovakia. Where else can you find such a good
school system? They also have theaters. There are two
Hungarian theaters in Komarno and Kosice. So, what are
they complaining about?71
A. Slovakia's Obligations Under the International System of Human
Rights Protection
In analyzing the legal status of the Hungarian minority in the
Slovak Republic, the minority's rights under the international system of
human rights and Slovakia's municipal law must be evaluated. Slovakia
has undertaken the responsibilities of ensuring internationally recognized
human rights standards through its ratification of numerous international
treaties, declarations and covenants. The effect of these instruments within
73. Gabriella Horvath, Nem Masodrendu Allampolgarok a Szlovakiaban elo Magyarok
[Hungarian Living in Slovakia Are Not Second-Class Citizens), UJ SZO, July 17,1996, at 1, 6.
(Julia Domsitz trans).
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Slovak borders, however, remains somewhat ambiguous and ratification of
these documents has not resulted in the realization of the rights and
freedoms protected therein within the domestic arena.
Slovakia is a state party to most human rights instruments. 74
Several of these documents oblige the Slovak government to take
affirmative steps to protect all individuals within its borders and to make
changes within its domestic arena to conform with international legal
norms. The three most relevant international documents ratified by the
Slovak government with regard to the protection of ethnic minorities are
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR)
(ratified by Slovakia on March 18, 1992)," the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) (ratified by the Slovak Republic on May
28, 1993), and the FCNM (ratified by Slovakia on June 21, 1995).
Despite official proclamations by the Slovak government regarding their
adherence to internationally accepted principles of human rights,
ratification has not resulted in municipal legislation that equally protects all
citizens. In contrast, the current trend of domestic legislation has attracted
international criticism and has brought into question, rather than
confirmed, Slovakia's commitment to the letter and spirit of the various
documents.
Several major achievements of international human rights
instruments in Slovakia must be noted. The most important success is the
ability of the instruments to affect and direct government policy.
Ratification of various international human rights documents from the
Council of Europe and the United Nations forced the Slovak government to
consider the provisions contained in those documents and find arguments to
support facial compliance with their terms. International instruments set
limits on the Slovak government's ability to pass restrictive legislation and
serve to direct foreign policy decisions. For example, the Slovak
government consulted international experts, such as the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) High Commissioner for
National Minorities, to review and comment upon- draft domestic
legislation affecting minorities. An International Law Division within the
Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established within the past year to
74. See generally The relevant international documents ratified by the Slovak Republic
include the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights (ratified by Slovakia on
Mar. 18, 1992), the FCNM (ratified by Slovakia on June 21, 1995), and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the Slovak Republic on May 28, 1993), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified on Jan. 1, 1993), UNESCO Convention Against
Discrimination in Education (ratified on Mar. 31, 1993), the International Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights (ratified on May 28, 1993), and the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities.
75. ECHR Protocols 1 through 10 have also been ratified.
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evaluate domestic compliance with international obligations. International
human rights instruments strongly influence Slovakia's political climate.
Positive pressure has been exerted upon the government by members of the
Hungarian minority to ensure state fulfillment of its obligations under
ratified human rights documents. Slovak political discourse is consumed
by various, and often conflicting, interpretations of the precise obligations
embodied in these documents and their relation to municipal law. Despite
the lack of consensus, such dialogue is a healthy exercise that encourages
Slovakia's democratic transformation.
The non-realization of the protections granted in the
aforementioned documents is a product of the general ambiguity
surrounding the role of international instruments within the domestic arena.
The Slovak Constitution does not contain a special provision defining the
relationship between ratified international documents in general and the
municipal legal system. The text of international treaties and documents is
published along with all domestic legislation in the Collection of Laws of
the Slovak Republic. 6 Because of this fact, Constitutional Court Judge Jan
Klucka asserts that the relationship between international and municipal
law--is-based on the monistic principle which grants international law
primacy over municipal law and the state constitution in Slovak courts."
Mr. Jozavice of the International Law Department of the Slovak Ministry
of Foreign Affairs is less clear about the status of treaties in Slovak
domestic law. He opined that:
[t]here is currently no answer to whether or not treaties are
self-executing. On one hand, it has been suggested that
they are not because it is only through [municipal] law that
rights can be proscribed to a citizen. It seems necessary,
therefore, to adopt a specific law implementing the
stipulation contained in the treaty. On the other hand, this
interpretation is in conflict with Article 11 of the Slovak
Constitution which stipulates that international treaties take
priority over domestic provisions. In fact, international
legal documents are treated the same as municipal
legislation and published in the Collection of Laws like all
other laws of Parliament.78
76. Collection of Laws of the Slovk. Rep., Law No. 1/1993.
77. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
78. Interview with Mr. Milan Jozavice, International Law Division of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 15, 1996).
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Chapter 9, Article 153 of the Slovak Constitution also concerns the
incorporation of international obligations. Article 153 provides that
Slovakia "shall be a successor to all rights and duties ensuing from
international treaties . . . ." The question arises, however, as to whether
this provision is a de facto ratification of international documents.
While not including any express provision on the authority of
international law in general, the Slovak Constitution does provide for the
conditional authority of international human rights instruments. Article 11
mandates that before any state authority determines a question involving
the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, a comparison of
international and municipal law must be made to determine which system
grants broader rights. If the international document is broader in scope
and encompasses greater freedoms, that provision governs the domestic
decision. Judge Klucka stated that, in this sense, the role international
human rights law plays within Slovak borders is very clear. "There is no
autonomous Slovak approach to defining human rights," asserts Judge
Klucka. "The courts, and presumably the Parliament, must consider
internationally accepted human rights definitions.""9 Mr. Branislav
Lichardus, Slovak Ambassador to the United States, recently opined that
Slovakia "is one of the leading European countries in terms of protection
of the rights of ethnic minorities" because "[i]t is one of the few European
countries where international treaties on human rights take precedence over
its own laws, provided they secure greater rights and freedoms. "10 As Mr.
Bugar of MKDH noted:
The Slovak government has repeatedly asserted that
national minorities living in Slovakia have the highest
standard of minority rights in Europe. How can they say
this when our legislation violates the Articles of our own
Constitution? In Slovakia, the government does not give
rights above the Constitution but rather, they take away
these guarantees through the promulgation of domestic
legislation. So how can they speak about rights above the
standard? [Ethnic Hungarians] are not asking for new,
additional rights. We only want to maintain what we have
79. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).'
80. Branislav Lichardus, Letter to the Editor, Slovakia's Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
1996, at E14.
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had before. The government is taking away the system of
rights we have had for years.'
One explanation for the present confusion about the role of international
law derives from the fact that Slovakia has only been subject to
international law for three years. As a result, the large majority of lawyers
and judges are unfamiliar with international legal doctrines. Judge Klucka
observed:
There is a need to learn about international standards. We
have a forty year legal gap that we now need to fill very
quickly. Three years is a short time for judges to gain
practical skills in applying international standards. It is
necessary for judges to be aware of [European] case-law in
order to understand the legal meaning of international
human rights provisions. Often there is no Slovak
translation of cases or international materials and this
prevents a deeper understanding of the legal principles
involved. 2
Beyond the need for those working within the legal system to educate
themselves about principles of international human rights law, Slovak
citizens must familiarize themselves with the system of human-rights
protection, as well as their right to take complaints against the government
to the European Court of Human Rights. Mr. Ondrej Srebala of the
Slovak Center for Human Rights noted that:
[t]he legal consciousness [of Slovak citizens] has been very
damaged by the previous communist era. A certain
amount of civic braveness is missing from our citizenry.
The quick leap to democracy has caused some people to
act childish and to retreat from our new democratic
system. Citizens still don't know how to use democratic
legal means. For example, it is considered impolite in
Slovakia to make claims to the European Court [of Human
Rights]. It is felt that our problems should be dealt with
here, not abroad. It will take time for the people to learn
that the European Court is also our court.'3
81. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, MKDH Chairman, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
82. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
83. Interview with Mr. Ondrej Srebala, Director of the Slovak Center for Human Rights,
in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 12, 1996).
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Through ratification of the ECHR, the Slovak government has accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The
right to individual petition before the European Commission for Human
Rights is also recognized." Slovakia has obliged itself to "secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" as defined by
the ECHR. Ratification of the aforementioned documents must not be used
as a pretext for state inaction on a domestic level with regard to the
protection of human rights and must not be considered "an accelerated way
of establishing [Slovakia's] democratic credentials." 85 Regarding the rights
of national minorities, no lower standards than those set by the
international community should be accepted in the Slovak Republic.
Municipal enforcement of the provisions of international human
rights provisions is largely defined by the Slovak Constitutional Court.
The 1992 Constitution of the Slovak Republic established a Constitutional
Court which possesses the competence to hear appeals of final decisions by
central government authorities, local government authorities, and local
self-governmental bodies brought by individuals involving violations of
fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. 86 Cases can be brought before
the Constitutional Court through a variety of means:
1) by one-fifth of the National Council members;
2) by the president;
3) by the government;
4) by any court; or
5) by the Attorney General. 81
There have only been six cases where the Slovak Constitutional Court has
utilized provisions contained in international human rights documents to
formulate its holding. This is out of a total of 2635 total cases heard by
the Constitutional Court since 1993. 8
84. On March 4, 1996, the European Commission for Human Rights declared the
application of Ladislav and Aurel Brezny against the Slovak Republic inadmissible. The
application concerned restitution for property confiscated by the former Socialist Republic of
Czechoslovakia. See generally EUR. COMM'N H.R. 23131/93, 106 (Mar. 3, 1996).
85. Michael O'Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate Under Strasbourg Case-Law with
Reference to Eastern and Central Europe, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 263, 265 (1993).
86. SLOVK. CONST. art. 127.
87. SLOVK. CONST. art. 130. Currently, the constitutionality of the Slovak Language
Law, as described below, is under consideration by the court.
88. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
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B. Slovakia's Constitutional Framework for the Protection of
National Minorities
While Slovakia must adhere to the principles of international
human rights standards, its domestic policy must also comply with the
constitution of the Slovak Republic adopted on September 3, 1991. While
the Slovak Constitution confers rights unprecedented in the history of
Slovakia, these rights are not inalienable as they may be amended by law.89
The objective to protect individuals within state borders from arbitrary
state power is not served by such a constitutional framework. The
constitution largely fails to provide any real guarantees that the conferred
rights may not be stripped away at the will of a parliamentary majority
during times of economic hardship or political unrest.
The preamble to the constitution of the Slovak Republic
immediately caused a stir among minority groups in Slovakia. It begins:
"We the Slovak nation . . . . " This expression implies that only ethnic
Slovaks are concerned by and awarded rights under the constitution, rather
than all people residing within the borders of the Slovak Republic. This
impression is confirmed by the following phrase "together with members
of national minorities and ethnic groups," thus relegating national
minorities to a secondary position. Ethnic Hungarians objected to the
Constitution claiming that minorities cannot be said to have an equal
position under the Slovak Constitution.
Chapter 2, Section 4, Article 34 of the constitution articulates the
rights of national minorities and ethnic groups. The first two clauses of
this article concern rights to be conferred upon minorities, and include
provisions for the promotion of cultural heritage and language.Y The
constitution guarantees the right to education and official communication in
minority languages. 91 Both of these paragraphs, however, contain the
89. In the first 54 articles of the Slovak Constitution, guarantees are conferred and then
made amendable by law 42 times. See John A. Young, Human Rights and the Slovak
Constitution, Promoting HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE NEWSLETrER, Apr. 1994, at 9.
90. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 1 reads:
Citizens of national minorities or ethnic groups in the Slovak Republic are guaranted
the development of particularly the rights to promote their cultural heritage with other
citizens of the same national minority or ethnic group, receive and disseminate
information in their mother tongues, form associations, and create and maintain
educational and cultural institutions. Details thereof shall be fixed by law.
(paraphrase). SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 1
91. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 2 reads:
In addition to the right to learn the official language, the citizens of national minorities
or ethnic groups shall, under provisions fixed by law, also be guaranteed: a) the right
to be educated in a minority language, b) the right to use a minority language in
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restrictive "to be fixed by law" phrases, making these provisions rather
feeble constitutional rights. Furthermore, according to the final paragraph
of Article 34, the exercise of the enumerated rights "may not threaten the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or discriminate
against other citizens."9 This paragraph may provide a legal justification
for any law containing discriminatory measures against minorities. A
request by ethnic Hungarians for more Hungarian language schools or a
plea by Ruthenians for more control of their own cultural affairs could be
construed by some as threatening the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic
and a parliamentary majority could circumvent and prohibit these attempts.
Any measure detrimental to minorities can always be founded in the
promotion of the interests of other citizens. Mr. Laszlo Pirovits of
Hungarian Civic Party opined that:
[i]t is not at all possible to defend article 34 section 3 of
the Constitution of the Slovak Republic[.] The question
automatically arises whether the implementation of rights
of another citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution, may
[threaten the State's sovereignty of territorial integrity].
Since the article concerns individual and not collective
rights, it is not in this context defensible at all. This
codification is in conflict with the individual article 13,
section 3 of the Constitution, according to which the legal
definition of constitutional rights and freedoms must apply
equally. On the other hand, a threat to sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the republic also fulfills the actual
essence of a criminal act, which would be the case for
every subject. Such a provision violates the essence of the
equality of rights before the law[.] 93
Section 34(3) is clearly in conflict with the letter and spirit of Article 34,
which is meant to assure the rights of national minorities. The legislative
and executive branches of government are thus, under the constitution, free
to discriminate against minorities whenever a threat is perceived.
Given the prevalence of restrictive clauses throughout the Slovak
Constitution, ethnic minorities are not ensured constitutional guarantees to
the use of minority languages and their culture. Rather, the Slovak
Constitution establishes a framework of minority protection which can be
official communications, c) the right to participate in decision making in matters
affecting the national minorities and ethnic groups. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 2
92. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34, para. 3 (1993).
93. Constitutionalism (Transcript of a discussion held on January 28-29, 1993), in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 106-7 (1994).
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chiseled away in times of political or economic strife. In a state where
ethnic Slovaks constitute approximately eighty-five percent of the
population, the constitution should serve to safeguard ethnic minority
rights from the will or tyranny of the majority. Given Slovakia's
centralized political system, the potential for constitutional rights being
supplanted by restrictive legislation is clear. This risk is particularly acute
for minority culture and education, as public spending on these activities is
directed from the state. The question is: Which rights are supreme -
constitutional or statutory rights? Mr. Jozavice responds that: "In my
opinion, the [rights granted in the] constitution should be enforced. It
should set forth rights without qualification, without creating room for the
legislature to undermine the role of the constitution itself. It suffers
detail."' A reasonable reading of a state's constitution should lead to a
determination that it is the supreme law of the land to be interpreted by a
court with jurisdiction over such issues. The framework of the Slovak
Constitution makes it unclear as to whether a parliamentary majority may
restrict or even completely eradicate freedoms set forth therein.
C. Slovak Municipal Law Under International Human Rights and
Slovak Constitutional Analysis
Slovak municipal legislation analyzed below calls into question
Slovakia's commitment to democratic principles and internationally
accepted human rights standards. Municipal laws are employed to analyze
Slovak compliance with bilateral treaties and regional and universal human
rights instruments ratified by the Slovak government. In addition,
legislation is analyzed utilizing non-binding international documents that
demonstrate developing custom within international human rights law.
1. The State Language Law
On November 15, 1995, the Slovak Parliament adopted the Slovak
Language Law (The Language Law)." This law regulates the use of the
State Language (Slovak) in Slovakia and provides for the protection of the
language. The law has been perceived by many ethnic Hungarians and
international critics alike, as threatening the future existence of the
Hungarian language in Slovakia. Critics of the Language Law claim that it
takes away the right to use the Hungarian language and other minority
languages. It is important to note that, besides language, members of the
Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic do not differ greatly from
94. Interview with Mr. Milan Jozavice, International Law Department of the Slovak
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 15, 1996).
95. Zakon Narodnej rady Slovenskej republiky c. 270/1995 o statnom jazyku. [This law
entered into effect on Jan. 1, 1996.]
1997]
56 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
ethnic Slovaks. Ethnic Hungarians do not have any racially distinctive
features nor do they adhere to a different religion. It is language that
unites members of the Hungarian minority. For this reason, any restriction
on the right or opportunity to use the Hungarian language has a great effect
on the cultural identity and integrity of the Hungarian community in
Slovakia.
When the draft of the Language Law was submitted to the Slovak
National Council on October 24, 1995, a justification statement outlining
the objectives of the legislation was attached. This justification reveals that
the Language Law is partly, if not wholly, intended as a means of getting
back at Hungarians for past injustices. For example, the justification
asserts that
[t]he Ancient Slovak language (alongside Hebrew, Greek
and Latin) became the fourth language of liturgy and
diplomacy in Europe. Forced Hungarianization during the
time of historic Hungary, as well as between the years
1938 and 1945, when Hungary occupied a large part of
Southern Slovakia, inflicted wounds that remain open to
this day.9
Mr. Juraj Zervan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that
"bilingualism is not usable for our country. It is the responsibility of
persons first to feel part of the whole society, rather than to have
allegiance to only a certain group. "9
Passage of the Language Law created a legal vacuum in relation to
the use of minority languages. The recent legislation replaces the 1990
Law on the Official Language, a law premised upon the Language Law of
the first Czechoslovak Republic of the inter-war years.98 By replacing the
1990 legislation, the Language Law takes away certain rights concerning
minority languages and fails to confer new ones. The disequilibrium
created is not balanced by a corresponding law on minority languages. It
is obscured where and under what circumstances usage of the Hungarian
language is legally permissible. Although the Slovak government assured
96. Text attached to the Draft-law on the state Language as submitted to the Slovak
Parliament, Oct. 24, 1995. Translation of this document was provided by the Hungarian Civic
Party.
97. Interview with Mr. Juraj Zervan, Director of the Department of National Minorities
Division, Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bratislava, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
98. See Language Law, para. 12: Law 428/1990 (declaring that "[the law] on the official
language of the Slovak Republic is made void." It is significant to note the change from an
"official" language to the further reaching concept of a state language. This modification
suggests that the Language Law is more encompassing than the Law on the Official Language.
This alteration is questionable in a state that is multi-ethnic.
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the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities that legislation on
the use of minority languages would soon follow passage of the Language
Law,99 such a measure has yet to even be discussed in Parliament despite
persistent urging by all minority communities in Slovakia.' ® As the year
anniversary of enactment of the Language Law passes, there is still no
official government draft for such legislation.101
The Slovak government is considering ratification of the European
Charter on Regional or Minority Languages as an alternative to issuing a
legislative measure on the use of minority languages. 0 2 This document
provides that signatory states will not place obstacles in the way of
promoting minority languages. Provisions for the teaching and studying of
minority languages at all appropriate levels are also included.103  The
Ministry of Culture, however, proposed an alternative to ratification of this
Charter. Rather than a specific law on minority language use, the Ministry
suggested promulgating a law on the relationship between citizens and state
administrative authorities in local offices.'°' The proposal would include a
provision stating that Slovak is the language to be used in official contacts
throughout the state unless a person could prove that he or she was not able
to learn Slovak for an objective reason.03 A definition of an objective
reason was not provided.
In light of the Slovak government's failure to propose a law on the
use of minority languages as it promised last year, many ethnic Hungarians
view the Language Law as the first step toward the elimination of
Hungarian culture in Slovakia. One ethnic Hungarian resident of Zlaty
Klasy noted:
The goal of the Slovak government is first to have us speak
Slovak in official settings and then to have us speak Slovak
in our schools until eventually Hungarian truly becomes a
kuchinska rec [a kitchen language], a language only
99. See generally SME, Jan. 16, 1996.
100. On June 10, 1996, Czech, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Hungarian and Bulgarian cultural
associations submitted a joint proclamation criticizing the Slovak government for failing to pass a
measure regulating the use of minority languages. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR,
June 10, 1996.
101. In November 1996, the Slovak Nationalities Council rejected a draft law submitted by
the Hungarian opposition parties. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Nationalities Council Rejects
Minority Language Law, OMRI DAILY DIGEST II, No. 22 (Nov. 22, 1996) (last visited Oct.
28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
102. See supra note 72
103. Id. art. 8.
104. See generally UJ SZO, Aug. 1, 1996, at 1.
105. Id.
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spoken at home. That is why it is important to use the
Hungarian language in a wider context because, if not, we
will forget words and eventually adopt the Slovak
language. This is what they want, for us to forget our
language, and therefore, forget our culture.1°
The Language Law has been criticized largely due to its
vagueness. The statute's ambiguity provides those who will apply the law
the freedom of interpretation.t 0 For example, Section 1(2) ("The State
Language has a priority over other languages applied on the whole
territory of the Slovak Republic")'1 and 1(4) ("The law does not regulate
the usage of languages of national minorities and ethnic groups. Usage of
those languages is regulated by separate laws") are potentially
contradictory. While clause 1(2) states that Slovak has the priority, clause
1(4) states that other languages are not touched by the law.'1 In what
sense, then, is the Slovak language supreme?
The Language Law does not regulate languages used in religious
ceremonies. Section 1(3) states that "[t]he law does not regulate the usage
of liturgic languages. Usage of those languages is arranged by the
regulations of churches and religious communities." While the Language
Law does not regulate church weddings, it is unclear whether the word
"yes" or "I do" in a civil, non-church wedding ceremony can be spoken in
Hungarian or whether the Language Law mandates that it be uttered in the
state language. On June 26, 1996, when asked by a Hungarian Assembly
member of the Council of Europe whether the Hungarian language could
be used during official marriage ceremonies, Prime Minister Meciar
asserted that marriage ceremonies could take place in any language since
the freedom to speak any language is enjoyed by all."0 This statement
implies that, under the Language Law, an ethnic Hungarian could say the
Hungarian word Igen [yes] during a civil wedding ceremony. The
Ministry of Culture, however, issued a directive stating the opposite
conclusion. The Ministry of Culture asserts that the affirmation must be
106. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian resident, in Zlaty Klasy, Slovakia (June 30, 1996).
107. One local official interpreted the law as giving him the right to refuse an ethnic
Hungarian to send a telegram in Hungarian. See generally Democracy Seen at Risk in
Bratislava, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 26, 1995.
108. The translation of the Language Law quoted in this report was provided by the
American Embassy in Bratislava.
109. Paragraph 2 was added in the final parliamentary debate on the law, which may
explain the lack of reflection. This makeshift drafting style hardly makes for legal credibility.
110. Statement of Mr. Vladimir Meciar, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, (June 26, 1996).
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spoken in Slovak."' State interference in one of the most intimate of
ceremonies is viewed as a direct attack on Hungarian culture by ethnic
Hungarians. Mr. Bugar noted that:
This is how [the government] can provoke ethnic
Hungarians. If my daughter wants to have a civil marriage
and if the government forces her to use a language other
than her mother tongue during such an intimate ceremony,
I'm not a radical, but I think I would break the room into
pieces.
Section 2(2) demands that each citizen have knowledge of the
Slovak language as defined by the Ministry of Culture. This approach
places full definitional control with a state organ. The potential for abuse
of governmental discretion in this area may result in discrimination against
Hungarians who may mispronounce words or may not have as extensive a
vocabulary in Slovak as a native speaker.
Section 3(2) makes knowledge of the Slovak language a
prerequisite for government employment. Section 3(1) and (2) indicate
that all communications constituting official transaction, as well as all
communications within government and administration workplaces must be
conducted in Slovak. 1 2 While not precluding the use of other languages,
the wording of Section 3 suggests that supplementary use of Slovak is
compulsory in nearly all official matters. Moreover, Section 3(5) states
that contact with the administration must be conducted in Slovak. 3 This
section mandates that, in order to use Hungarian during an official
111. Ministerstvo Kultury Slovenskej Republiky [Minister of Culture of the Slovak
Republic], Cislo MK 551/96 - SSJaNP, (Mar. 1, 1996).
112. Language Law Section 3 reads:
[1] In the course of accomplishment of their duties, the state authorities and state
organizations, the authorities of territorial self-administration and the authorities of
public and legal institutions . . . the state language shall be, by those authorities, used
compulsorily on the whole territory of the Slovak Republic. Demonstration of
commensurate knowledge of the state language by word of mouth and writing is a
qualification for being taken into service, or for entering a similar occupational
relationship, as well as a prerequisite for accomplishing work agreed within specified
job description at a public and legal authority.
[2] The employees and officials of the public and legal authorities, employees in
transport and communications, as well as the armed forces officers, the officers of
armed security corps, of other armed forces officers, of other armed corps and fire
brigades, shall use the state language in contact on official lines.
Slovak Language Law §(3).
113. Slovak Language Law Section 3(5) states that "[w]ritten appeals addressed to the
public and legal authorities shall be presented in the state language." Slovak Language Law §
3(5).
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meeting, a Slovak interpreter must be present at all times and minutes must
be kept in both Slovak and Hungarian. This requirement will undoubtedly
cause problems in congregations where all participants are Hungarian, as is
largely the case in municipalities throughout southern Slovakia. Section
3(5) also mandates that citizens would be obliged to submit a copy of every
appeal in Slovak, which is an unnecessary obstacle where both the
appellant and the officials have Hungarian as their first language.
In response to Section 3(5) of the Language Law, several mayors
of towns located in southern Slovakia issued directives allowing for the use
of both Slovak and Hungarian in official contacts despite Ministry of
Culture claims that such action is illegal.114 The first local authority to take
such action was Velka Maca, a village with approximately eighty-eight
percent of its 2600 residents of Hungarian nationality. The declaration,
unanimously passed by the local council, allows Hungarian to be used in
official contacts, including at local offices, cultural events, doctor's
offices, and stores. Numerous villages and towns in Slovakia's southern
region have since followed Velka Maca's lead. Mayor Jozsef Szaraz of
Cvory nad Zitavou, where four-fifths of more than 5000 people are
ethnically Hungarian, refuted allegations that such directives were contrary
to the Language Law. Mayor Szaraz asserted that such measures "simply
enable the people to communicate in their mother tongue. ""'
Section 8(5) reads "[iun proceedings with the public and legal
authorities concerning contracts settling the involvement relations [sic],
only the wording in the state language is acknowledged." This section
may put ethnic Hungarian lawyers out of business. If two ethnic
Hungarian business partners want to ensure the enforceability of their
contract in a Slovak court, the Language Law mandates that the document
be drafted in Slovak. Section 8(4), states that "[tihe contact of the medical
care personnel is conducted, as a rule, in the state language; in case of a
citizen or foreigner not having a command of the state language, also in the
language in which mutual understanding with the patient is possible. "11 6
In February 1996, four language consultants began working in
three regional districts and in Bratislava to supervise observance of the
language law, although monetary penalties for violating the law cannot be
114. Pavol Mudry, Slovakia: Ethnic Hungarians Worried By Language Law, INT'L PRESS
SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1996. See also Samorin A Okolie/Somorja Es Videke [Samorin and the
Surrounding Environment], Vseobecne Zavazne Nariadenie Mesta Samorin 0 Pouzivani Jazyka
Narodnostnych Mensin Na Uzemi Mesto Samorin, Jan. 26, 1996. This is law of the town
council of the town of Samorin allowing residents to use either the Slovak or Hungarian
languages in official contacts.
115. Id.
116. For further issues upon which the Language Law touches, see sections below
concerning legislation regulating education, names, road signs, and mass media.
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issued until 1997. On March 12, 1996, the Hungarian daily, Uj Szo,
published an interview with Dr. Andrej, an official language advisor to the
Slovak Ministry of Culture for the Galanta and Dunajska Streda region.
Dr. Andrej found that individuals living in these two regions were well-
informed about the provisions of the Language Law and usually observed
them. He cited only one village where the local chronicles were written
only in Hungarian, and warned the village mayor that the village annals
would have to be recorded in both Slovak and Hungarian.
Passage of the Language Law, with its stiff monetary penalties and
restrictive provisions, has antagonized ethnic Hungarians. The Language
Law has been used by Slovak citizens as a means of harassing ethnic
Hungarians. In the town of Samorin, two individuals pretending to be
language inspectors from the Ministry of Culture threatened local
inhabitants with fines due to their public use of the Hungarian language."7
Although government officials proclaim that such behavior is criminal, no
suspects have been detained. "It is as though the government has
criminalized our language," complained one ethnic Hungarian.", The law
excludes penalizing individuals for violating its mandates, but imposes stiff
monetary fines on businesses. Business owners could be fined up to
50,000 Slovak crowns (approximately $1650) and business entities could
be forced to pay up to 500,000 Slovak crowns (approximately $16,500)."n
The Language Law launched Slovakia into the international
spotlight and provoked questioning of Slovakia's commitment to
democratic principles. A United States Congressional Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe wrote a letter to the Slovak
Ambassador to the United States, Branislav Lichardus, stating that the real
intent of the Language Law is "not merely to regulate the use of the Slovak
language, but to restrict the freedom of speech in Slovakia."12° Hungarian
Ambassador to Slovakia, Mr. Jeno Boros, views the Language Law as the
devaluation of multi- or bilingualism. He stated, "There is an old
expression in this part of the world that says that the more languages you
know, the better person you are. Now you hear a new expression: The
more languages you know, the worse Slovak you are."12' The Slovak
117. See generally NOVY CAS, June 12, 1996, at 2.
118. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian citizen, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 2, 1996).
119. See Pavol Mudry, Slovakia: Ethnic Hungarians Worried By Language Law, INT'L
PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1996.
120. James Morrison, Selling Slovakia, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A17. This letter
was signed by Senators Alphonse D'Amato (NY-R), Frank Lautenberg (NJ-D), and
Representatives Christopher Smith (NJ-R) and Steny Hoyer (MD-D).
121. Stephen Kinzer, Democracy Seen At Risk In Bratislava, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec.
28, 1995, at A1, 5.
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government asserts that the Language Law is compatible with international
human rights standards.'2 The truth is, however, that not many states have
state language laws. Moreover, most of the state language laws in
existence take into consideration the protection of minority languages. 23 In
other multilingual states where one language is dominant in numbers and a
minority language is found primarily in one region, there are other
solutions, such as a special administrative order for that region that do not
require regulations to protect the dominant language. In yet other states,
minority languages are given equal legal status to the dominant language.124
None of these protective measures have been taken in Slovakia.
The Language Law's restrictiveness is contrary to both municipal
legal principles and international norms. Most notably, the Language
Law's prohibition of the use of minority languages in administrative
contacts appears to conflict with both Slovak constitutional guarantees and
express provisions contained in binding international instruments. Section
3 of the Language Law blatantly conflicts with the spirit of Article 34 of
the Slovak Constitution. Article 34(3) reads:
in addition to the right to learn the official language, the
citizens of national minorities or ethnic groups shall, under
provisions fixed by law, also be guaranteed: a) the right to
be educated in a minority language, b) the right to use a
minority language in official communications, c) the right
to participate in decision making in matters affecting the
national minorities and ethnic groups.,,-,
This article clearly provides for the use of minority languages in
administrative contacts. This guarantee, however, is subject to the
restrictive "fixed by law" clause. The Language Law's constitutionality
has been challenged and the issue is currently pending before the
Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court Judge Klucka views the
Language Law as creating a legal gap between itself and the constitutional
guarantees. 26 If the constitution is to be given credibility and weight as the
founding legal document in Slovakia's legal system, the Constitutional
Court should hold that express constitutional guarantees are not to be
122. Justification, end of part II.
123. France, Lithuania, Belgium and Holland have language laws.
124. See, e.g., Finland.
125. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34(3).
126. Interview with Judge Jan Klucka, Slovak Constitutional Court, in Kosice, Slovakia
(July 18, 1996).
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limited, restricted, or eradicated by domestic legislation.'" The right to
use one's mother tongue in administrative affairs is not ensured in Slovakia
because of the absence of any law on minority languages.
Minority language rights within the international human rights
framework emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century and have
increasingly gained recognition as a protected right. In the absence of
provisions relating to the protection of minorities in the League of Nations
era, a series of treaties were established to secure minority status during
the inter-war years. These treaties largely incorporated the principles of
non-discrimination and equality, the right to citizenship, the right of
minorities to establish their own institutions, and a state obligation to
provide an equitable share of financial support toward primary schools in
minority languages when there was sufficient demand for such education."
Minority protection treaties during this period were largely patterned after
the Polish Minority Protection Treaty of 1919. Article 7 of this treaty
provided that "[n]o restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any
Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in
religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public
meetings." 129 This provision was also contained in the Czechoslovakian
Minorities Treaty of 1919.'10 Guarantees contained in the treaties pre-
empted municipal legislation that was contrary to the treaty provisions.
Treaty ratification required states to take positive steps to comply with the
rights embodied therein.
Beginning with the Charter of the United Nations (Charter), the
focus shifted from minority protection granting specific rights to
supporting the more general concept of non-discrimination. This concept
is equally applicable to all individuals regardless of ethnic majority or
minority status. Article 1(3) of the Charter provides for "promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to . . . language . . . " in order to achieve
international co-operation.'3 ' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
127. This statement should hold true unless the activity clearly threatens the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of the state or discriminates against other citizens. See SLOVK. CONST. art.
34, para. 3. The use of the Hungarian language during official contacts does not reach this
threshold.
128. See FERNAND DE VARENNES, LANGUAGE, MINORITIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 26
(1996).
129. For the full text of the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919, see PATRICK THORNBERRY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (1991), (Appendix 1 is excerpted from
Protection of Linguistic, Racial, and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations, IB
MINORITIES. 1927.I.B.2. (Geneva, Aug. 1927)).
130. Id. at 41.
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 3.
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(Declaration), in Article 2(1), also states that individuals are entitled to the
rights and freedoms included in the Declaration without regard to
language.'32 Language is a ground upon which discrimination is prohibited
under the ECHR Article 14.13 This principle is again set forth in the
CCPR in Article 2(1), and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights in Article 2(2).
The European Court of Human Rights in the Belgian Linguistics
Case analyzed the general anti-discrimination provision contained in the
ECHR.1'1 The applicants were the parents of families in Belgium who
applied for schooling on their behalf and on behalf of their children. The
gravamen of their complaint was that, as French speakers, they wanted
their children to be educated in French despite living in a region classified
under Belgian law as Dutch-speaking. By law, schooling had to be
conducted in the official language of the region. Thus, the Francophone
applicants alleged, the state was discriminating against them by failing to
provide schooling in their language in violation of Article 14.13- The court
held that legal and administrative distinctions that are objective and
reasonable are not violative of the ECHR's anti-discrimination clause. In
addition, the justifications must be proportional to the purposes of
maintaining such distinctions. In light of this ruling, the Slovak
government must have legitimate and balanced objectives for prohibiting
the use of the Hungarian language in public administration to comply with
Article 14.
International human rights customs with regard to minority
language rights have evolved since the Belgian Linguistics Case was
decided in 1968. Over the past two and a half decades several provisions
have been drafted and ratified that convey to varying degrees the right to
use minority languages in public administration. Legal or administrative
justifications must not only be non-discriminatory, they must also comply
with the terms and conditions of new binding instruments.' 36 The most
132. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Resolutions, Part 1, at 71 (1948).
133. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights art. 14 (hereinafter ECHR)
reads: "The enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status." See also ECHR art. 5(2) (right to receive information on the reasons for arrest in
a language one understands), id. art. 6 (the right to a fair and public hearing), id. art. 13 (the
right to an effective remedy before a national authority).
134. Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Usage of Languages in Belgium
[hereinafter the Belgian Linguistics Case], 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1968).
135. The parents also alleged violations of the First Protocol to the ECHR and ECHR
Article 8.
136. The specific instruments are discussed in detail below.
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significant instruments are the FCNM (1995) and the Recommendation of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe No. 1201 (1993)
(Recommendation 1201). Both of these documents contain provisions
allowing for the use of minority language in contacts with local authorities
in regions where substantial numbers of members of a particular minority
group reside.
In regions where minority language speakers are heavily
concentrated, public authorities should be able to respond to requests and
offer services in the minority language. Failure to do so could constitute a
violation of the right to non-discriminatory treatment by the state.' 37 In
southern Slovakia, speakers of the non-state language are numerous and
some residents may have limited proficiency in Slovak. This is
particularly true for young children or elderly citizens who conducted the
majority of their public and private communication in Hungarian. The
demographic data of the southern region demonstrates that the vast
majority of individuals encountered by public administrators will speak
Hungarian as their primary language. 38 Imposition of a state language
requirement may lead to greater delays in public services to non-native
speakers, higher costs for services if a bilingual public servant is needed,
difficulties in communicating information that could result in the loss of
benefits or services, and additional costs involved with traveling to an area
where bilingual services are available. Local authorities, in line with the
non-discrimination mandate of numerous international documents, should
provide an increasing number of services in the non-state language where a
substantial number of Hungarian citizens reside.' 9
In addition to concerns over discriminatory treatment in public
administration, the prerequisite of proficiency in the Slovak language for
137. In Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister of Educ., E.C.R. 3967 [1989], the European
Court of Justice stated that a state's linguistic policy cannot encroach upon a fundamental
freedom in a discriminatory manner. Any language preference, and the manner in which it is
applied, must be proportionate to the objective sought.
138. See generally AUAGUSTIN MAROK ET AL., SLOVAK-MAGYAR RELATIONS (1995). See
Groener supra note 137, at E.C.R. 3967); Selected Issues Viewed by Slovaks and Hungarians
Living in Ethnically Mixed Regions of Southern Slovakia, Sandor Marai Foundation & the
Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava (July 1994); Statement Issued on the
Occasion of the Hungarian Convention in Komarno (Jan. 4, 1994) (all statistics based on the
1991 Slovak census); PETER HUNCIK ET AL., COUNTERPROOF (1994); PAVOL FRIC ET AL.,
THE HUNGARIAN MINORITZ IN SLOVAKIA (1993).
139. Fernand de Varennes suggests several measures that local authorities could adopt to
conform with the non-discrimination principle including: 1) providing widely used official
documents and forms in minority language or bilingual versions; 2) accepting oral or written
applications in minority languages; 3) requests made in a minority language could be responded
to in the same language by local authorities; and 4) employing sufficient bilingual employees. DE
VARENNES, supra note 128, at 178.
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government employment is also disconcert.'1'  This may lead to
discrimination against members of minorities in employment for
government positions. Economic opportunity and success hinges upon
one's proficiency in the state language. As a result, Slovak native speakers
will benefit by this provision with regard to access to resources and to
public employment opportunities. In Slovakia, the state is a major
purveyor of employment, and ethnic Hungarians may be precluded from
the opportunities made available by the state solely on the basis of
language.
International human rights laws give special consideration to the
use of minority languages beyond protections against discrimination. Most
notably, the Slovak government has undertaken the obligation to respect
minority language usage in the SHBT. SHBT Article 15(4)(b) obliges the
Slovak government to respect the principles set forth in Recommendation
1201 .141 In relevant part the Recommendation states that every person shall
have the right freely to use his/her mother tongue in private and in public,
both orally and in writing. This right shall also apply to the use of his/her
language in publications and in the audiovisual sector. 42 In addition, the
regions in which substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the
persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to use their
mother tongue in their contacts with the administrative authorities and in
proceedings before the courts and legal authorities.13  By ratifying this
bilateral treaty, the Slovak government has committed itself to allow
individuals to communicate with administrative authorities in his or her
minority language. The requirement of paragraph 3 that "substantial
numbers of a national minority" group be present within a geographical
location for this right to be invoked is clearly met in the majority of towns
throughout southern Slovakia. In some towns and villages ethnic
Hungarians constitute more than eighty percent of the population. '4 Given
the binding nature of the SHBT, the Slovak government should provide
bilingual services in the majority of towns, cities, and villages located in
the southern region of Slovakia.
The public use of minority languages is also protected in numerous
other international instruments to which Slovakia is a party. The
protection of the use of minority languages is unconditionally provided for
in the CCPR. CCPR Article 27 states, "[iln those States in which ethnic,
140. This prerequisite is contained in section 3(2) of the Language Law.
141. See generally Recommendation 1201 art. 7(1),(3).
142. Id. art. 7(1).
143. Id. art. 7(3).
144. See Statement Issued on the Occasion of the Hungarian Convention in Komarno, by
the Hungarian Coalition (Jan. 4, 1994). These figures are based on the 1991 Slovak census.
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religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language." The language of Article 27
indicates that a system of minority language usage exceeds allowance
during criminal proceedings, as this situation is expliciy covered in
Article 14(3). Although unspecific, Article 27 seeks to promote equality
between minority and majority speakers. The provision's terms should
apply to official dealings where minority language speakers are at a
disadvantage, whether it be in law, administration, or in school. The
Human Rights Committee routinely inquires about the situation of minority
language schools, publications, court proceedings, television programs,
and radio broadcasts when member states make their human rights reports
to the Committee to monitor compliance with this article. 4 This
questioning evidences the broad scope of Article 27.
FCNM Article 10 contains a provision for the consideration of the
use of minority languages in official contacts. Article 10 states:
[1] [t]he Parties undertake to recognize that every person
belonging to a national minority has the right to use freely
and without interference his or her minority language, in
private and in public, orally and in writing.
[2] In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national
minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if those
persons so request and where such a request corresponds to
a real need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as
possible, the conditions which would make it possible to
use the minority language in relations between those
persons and the administrative authorities.'"4
These principles are set forth with some hesitation. Mr. Heinrich Klebes,
Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe, opined that although
"the use of the minority language represents one of the principle means by
which [members of national minorities] can assert and preserve their
identity," paragraph 2 does not cover all relations between persons
belonging to a national minority and public authorities. 47 Paragraph 2 does
include communication with administrative authorities, but only if the two
145. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
200 (1991).
146. FCNM supra note 71, art. 10.
147. Heinrich Klebes, Commentary to the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HUM. RTS. L.J. 92, 105 (1994).
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conditions of substantial numbers and a request for communication in
minority languages are met. This paragraph has been interpreted broadly
to include, for example, ombudsmen.'1 This Article was purposefully
worded very broadly to grant states a wide degree of discretion.
Nevertheless, it urges states to be as generous as possible in this area. As
the two requirements of paragraph 2 are met in Slovakia's southern region,
the Slovak government should provide for the use of minority languages in
relations with administrative authorities. The refusal of the Slovak
government to do so can be characterized as a failure to fulfill its
obligations under the FCNM.
In addition to the FCNM and the CCPR, various international
human rights documents have supported the use of minority languages in
the context of public administration. The Council of Europe's Vienna
Declaration on Human Rights, Appendix II, states:
We, Heads of State and Government of the members states
of the Council of Europe, have agreed as follows,
concerning the protection of national minorities: [P]ersons
belonging to national minorities must be able to use their
language both in private and in public and should be able
to use it, under certain conditions, in their relations with
the public authorities. 141
This principle is again set forth in the Council of Europe's
Recommendation 1134 (1990) on the Rights of Minorities. This
Recommendation enumerates general principles that states should apply to
respect the existence of national minorities within their borders,
specifically addressing principles relating to linguistic minorities.
Paragraph 12 articulates that "persons belonging to a linguistic minority
shall have access to adequate types and levels of public education in their
mother tongue." Paragraph 13 of Recommendation 1134 states:
[a]s far as European states are concerned they should...
ii. [t]ake all the necessary legislative, administrative,
judicial and other measures to create favourable conditions
to enable minorities to express their identity, to develop
their education, culture, language, traditions and customs;
148. Id. at 105.
149. Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, Council of Europe Summit, Vienna, Oct. 9,
1993. Reprinted in DE VARENNES, supra note 128, at 303.
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iv. Abstain from pursuing policies aimed at forced
assimilation of national minorities, from taking
administrative measures affecting the composition of the
population in areas inhabited by national minorities, and
from compelling such minorities to remain confined in
geographical and cultural 'ghettos;'
v. fully implement the provision of Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which
reads as follows: In those states in which ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language.'1°
The Report of Experts on National Minorities'' by the OSCE states in
paragraph II that "[the participating states] reconfirm that persons
belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve
and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to
maintain and develop their culture in all aspects, free of any attempts at
assimilation against their will." The experts noted, inter alia, the positive
results obtained through the use of education in one's mother tongue, and
funding the teaching of minority languages to the general public and in
teacher training programs.'5 2 Furthermore, the EU's Resolution on the
Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities ' 3 recommends,
in paragraph 9, that: "[M]ember states . . . take social and economic
measures including: providing for the use of the regional and minority
languages in public concerns [and] providing for consumer information and
product labeling in regional and minority languages."
When a state provides protection to its national minorities, a more
harmonious relationship can develop between the state and the minority
groups found within its borders. Language constitutes the essence of
Hungarian culture and community. Supplying language rights to the
Hungarian minority may be the most effective means of diffusing ethnic
tension in Slovakia. By imposing a state preference for speakers of a
150. Council of Europe's Recommendation 1134 on the Right of Minorities(1990).
151. Report of Experts on National Minorities, Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (now the OSCE), Geneva, July 19, 1991.
152. Id.
153. Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities
(European Union) European Parliament, Strasbourg, Oct. 30, 1987. Reprinted in DE
VARENNES, supra note at 128, at 26.
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certain language, the potential for discrimination against non-native
speakers of the designated language is great. Those who possess Slovak as
their primary language have a greater advantage for employment,
particularly by the state. Given Slovakia's centralized administration, this
advantage is enormous.The Slovak government must adhere to its obligations under
international human rights law. Specifically, the government agreed to
provide for the use of minority languages with local authorities in the
SHBT. In addition, numerous human rights instruments illustrate that
allowance for the minority language usage is a developing custom to be
respected by states. The politicization of language in Slovakia is not in
response to the inability of minority groups to speak the Slovak language,
because this is not a documented phenomenon. Rather, the government's
involvement with the regulation of language use derives from the desire to
create a common culture in Slovakia by forcing national minorities to
abandon their respective cultures and languages in order to fulfill the
government's nationalist agenda. The Slovak government must exercise
extreme care to balance the right of a state to safeguard the position of the
state language and to ensure that the languages of national minorities are
protected.
2. Minority Language Education
In 1995, the government launched the idea of alternative education
for minority children. The idea behind the plan is to give children,or rather
their parents, the opportunity to choose a Slovak, Hungarian or mixed
language education. The stated purpose of the project is to provide more
subjects to be taught in the Slovak language. This plan was also developed
to improve knowledge of the Slovak language among minority children.
Under the alternative education plan, Slovak is to be the language of
instruction for a certain number of hours each week. Only native Slovak
teachers would be allowed to teach certain subjects, such as history and
geography. - These teachers would be given extra wages in predominantly
Hungarian regions. An alternative education class would be established as
soon as demand was expressed, even if by only one pupil or parent. At
present, ethnic Hungarian children are free to choose an entirely Slovak
language school at every stage in their education. About one third of
ethnic Hungarian children make this choice. 1 4
Concerns about alternative education have been voiced by
members of the Hungarian minority. A prevailing criticism is that
alternative education is intended to eventually subdue all pure Hungarian-
154. The New Law on The State Language of the Slovak Republic, Istvan Lanstyak,
Bratislava 1996.
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language education in Slovakia. The program is perceived as a step
toward the gradual assimilation of ethnic Hungarian children and an
attempt to liquidate Hungarian schools, thereby decreasing the need for and
employment of Hungarian-speaking teachers. Fears are also expressed that
undue pressure would be employed to incite parents to choose the
alternative education form.'" Ethnic Hungarians assert that the term
alternate education is disingenuous, as school budgets may not be
increased adequately to provide for an increase in Slovak classes without a
decrease in Hungarian school budgets.
The government's response to these concerns has been to reiterate
that the educational program is entirely voluntary. This assertion,
however, has largely failed to ease the suspicions of ethnic Hungarians.
Hungarian distrust of the Slovak government's motives is reasonable given
a recent statement by the Minister of Education, Eva Sklavkovska. Ms.
Sklavkovska stated that the government objective was to establish at least
one Slovak class in all municipalities across the territory of southern
Slovakia, a goal independent of actual interest in such classes.5 6 A vast
majority of Hungarian parents, however, continue to reject the plan. An
ethnic Hungarian parent from Samorin expressed:
[flor us, there was no question as to whether we would
send our children to Hungarian schools. I attended a
Hungarian school and so did my husband. I think that, to
preserve our cultural identity, the basis of our children's
education must be in our mother tongue. Having my
children learn Hungarian history and literature is very
important and this information is only taught in Hungarian
schools. Without Hungarian language education, we
would only speak Hungarian at home and our language
would become a 'kuchinska rec,' a kitchen language.17
The decision for an ethnic Hungarian parent whether to send his or her
child to a Slovak or Hungarian school has as much to do with one's
opinions about cultural survival and political affiliation, as it does
educational choices. Mr. Laszlo Ollos of the Nitra Pedagogical College
asks, "[t]he absolute majority of Hungarian parents know that placing their
child in an alternative education school isn't only a decision about
155. See generally Sharon Fisher, An Education System in Chaos, TRANSITION, Sept. 8,
1995.
156. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, Dec. 9, 1994.
157. Interview with an ethnic Hungarian parent, in Samorin, Slovakia (Aug. 15, 1996.)
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education, but is also a political act in support of the policies of the current
government. Which Hungarian parent is willing to do that?" "
On April 6, 1995, a law giving the Ministry of Education the right
to dismiss and appoint school directors was passed. This authority has
been exercised to dismiss public education officials and replace them with
HZDS and SNS sympathizers. In Hungarian dominated areas, appointed
school-directors have been ethnic Slovaks and government-friendly. 9
Four ethnic Hungarian high school principals were fired after they helped
to organize an opposition to the government's alternative education plan.
Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, one of the principals who was terminated for his
activity, recalled his experience:
It was the government's strategy to wait to announce the
[alternative education] plan until the end of the school year
because they thought that all of the teachers would be too
tired to fight against it. On June 18th [1995], [the
Hungarian school principals] received the plan in the mail.
The letter told us that a meeting was planned for June 20th
to discuss what the plan meant. Well, we all knew what it
meant already!
Since I didn't have much time, I got together with three
other principals on June 19th and we wrote a statement
against the plan. Before the meeting on the 20th, thirteen
of the thirty school directors signed the petition against the
plan. Mr. Peus [the Director of Secondary Education]
read us the plan at the meeting and then [one of the
Hungarian principals] read the opposition statement. Mr.
Peus was angry and the meeting ended abruptly. The next
day, June 21st, I got a letter in the mail telling me that I
was fired. Mr. Peus signed the letter. All four of us who
drafted the petition were fired. The ironic thing is that I
had just received a certificate and money from Mr. Peus
five days before the meeting rewarding me for the good
job I was doing at the school. They thought that they
could scare the public by firing us and the result of this
would be that nobody would be against the [alternative
education] plan. But it didn't turn out the way that they
had planned because a wave of protest swept through
158. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Ollos, Professor at the Nitra Pedagogical College and
Hungarian Civic Party member, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 23, 1996).
159. See generally SME, May 20, 1995.
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[southern Slovakia] and people in communities organized
against the proposal.
In retrospect, I'm sad that I lost my job, but I still think
my sacrifice was necessary because it caused problems for
the government. I know that the threats to Hungarian
language schools are not finished, but national attention
was drawn to the situation after I was fired.'6
If the government is using its power to appoint and dismiss school officials
in a manner that suggests discrimination against ethnic Hungarian
principals, the government is acting contrary to international law. The
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 7 states that
"all are . . . entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration .... "161 CCPR Article 19 asserts that
"everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 'l 62
CCPR Article 18 and ECHR Article 9 guarantee the right of freedom of
thought and conscience. These provisions encompass the right to oppose a
government policy.
Another major problem facing Hungarian language education is the
lack of Hungarian speaking teachers. This problem is due to decrease in
university training of teachers in the Hungarian language. In addition,
insufficient numbers of recent university graduates are qualified to replace
retiring teachers .161 The age structure of active teachers is unfavorable
because between 1970 and 1989, termed the Husak Period after then
President Husak, government policy was to phase out the education of
teachers at the Hungarian Department of the Nitra Pedagogical College.
Today there are approximately 700 Hungarian students at the Pedagogical
College. During the Husak Period, this number was decreased to
approximately 100 Hungarian students. Mr. Laszlo Ollos of the
Department of Philosophy at the Nitra Pedagogical College explained:
[wie will need 1,500 Hungarian teachers to replace the
first generation of Hungarian teachers who will soon retire.
160. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, former principle of the Hungarian High School in
Samorin, Slovakia, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 10, 1996).
161. See generally International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, May 28, 1993
[hereinafter CCPR].
162. Id.
163. For extensive statistics on Hungarian language education, such as number of
pupils/students, availability of schools and teachers, see Education in the regions with mixed
nationalities (1993); See also Gabzdilova, Schools in the Slovak Republic with instruction in the
Hungarian language - present status, in MINORITIES IN POLITICS.
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We currently do not have enough Hungarian teachers to
replace them all. Yet there is constantly a threat to
decrease the number of Hungarian students admitted to the
College, as well as threats to decrease the number of
Hungarian faculty here. Further decreases will continue to
threaten the future of Hungarian education in Slovakia.
There can be no Hungarian language education without
teachers who can teach in the Hungarian language. '6
The total number of Hungarian students accepted at Nitra was reduced
from 1009 in 1994-95 to 700 in 1995-96.6, The Hungarian Department of
Nitra Pedagogical College is the only higher educational facility in
Slovakia where it is possible to take classes conducted in the Hungarian
language. At Comenius University in Bratislava, it is possible to study
Hungarian as a foreign language, however, the language of instruction is
Slovak and knowledge of the Slovak language is required of all students."
In September 1996, the Slovak Parliament passed an ominous
measure that will further centralize government control over university
education. 17 The law increases the Education Ministry's competence to
allot subsidies and gives the Education Ministry the right to veto the
appointment of professors and assistant professors.'- Although it is
premature to predict the effect of the law on the Hungarian minority, this
new law may be employed to nullify the appointment of ethnic Hungarian
professors. This suspicion is reasonable given the current political climate
in Slovakia and the articulated hostility of the Ministry of Education to
Hungarian language education.
Ethnic Hungarian students are under-represented in Slovak
universities.'6 This is a sociological problem that affects members of the
164. Interview with Mr. Laszlo Ollos, Professor at the Nitra Pedagogical College and
Hungarian Civic Party member, in Samorin, Slovakia (July 23, 1996).
165. See generally NARODNA OBRODA, Feb. 21, 1995.
166. If the minority is considered too small and the effort of founding and maintaining
higher level education in the Hungarian language too costly, organized scholarship systems for
student exchanges with Hungary can be considered. This would be completely in the spirit of
international exchange and cooperation recommended by numerous international agreements.
See supra FCNM supra note 71, art. 12 (3).
167. This measure was vetoed by President Kovacs and later re-approved by Parliament on
October 23, 1996. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Re-Approves Controversial Laws, 207
OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Oct. 24, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/
publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
168. See Jiri Pehe, Slovak Parliament Rules on Universities, 188 OMRI DAILY DIG. II,
(Sept. 27, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
169. This point is elaborated in Gabzdilova, see MINORITIES IN POLITICS supra note 163.
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Hungarian minority and the state because they do not benefit from the total
intellectual resources of its citizenry.7 0 Reasons given for this under-
representation include the lower social and economic standing of ethnic
Hungarians, the lack of incentives for Hungarian students to study at
Slovak universities, insufficient knowledge of education possibilities, and
insufficient proficiency in the Slovak language. '1'
Nationalist interests resulted in the cancellation of a school
textbook entitled Slovakia in the New Century that was to be published in
1997. Although five of the six members of the oversight committee at the
Ministry of Education supported its publication, the history textbook was
canceled due to its sections pertaining to the de facto Slovak state in
existence between 1939 and 1945 and the Czechoslovak state from 1918
and 1945.172 Matica Slovenska, a cultural organization aimed at promoting
the Slovak nation, successfully opposed publication of the textbook for its
inclusion of criticism of the Slovak government's compliance with Hitler's
regime during World War II and for its failure to include information
concerning the abuse and humiliation inflicted on Slovaks by the Czechs
during pre-war Czechoslovakia. Mr. Jan Benko, vice-chairman of the
history section at Matica Slovenska, explained the organization's
opposition to the textbook: "Slovak history is a fight for national
sovereignty and Slovak statehood. National history . . . must have its
pride. This 'textbook' lacks the sense and pride of national history. It
therefore cannot be used to educate our children to become patriots. They
cannot, they must not, learn from this textbook.""'
The Slovak Constitution specifically guarantees the right to be
educated in a minority language.11 This guarantee, however, is weakened
by a fixed by law clause that could limit or restrict this constitutional right.
Furthermore, exercise of the rights granted in Article 34 of the constitution
may not "threaten the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic or discriminate
against other citizens."", The provision granting the right to be educated
in one's minority language should not be categorized as a threat to Slovak
sovereignty. As long as education in the Slovak language continues to be
170. Only 2.1% of ethnic Hungarians have university degrees, as compared with 6.5%of
Slovaks and 8% of the Ukrainian minority (due to positive discrimination during the communist
era).
171. See MINORITIES IN POLITICS, supra note 163, at 170-71.
172. See Jana Dorotkova, Matica Slovenska Cancels History Textbook, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 3.
173. Id.
174. SLOVK. CONST. art. 34(2)(a). In addition to the right to learn the official language,
the citizens of national minorities or ethnic groups shall, under provision fixed by law, also be
guaranteed: (b) the right to be educated in a minority language.
175. Id. art. 34(3).
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supported by the Slovak government, the maintenance of Hungarian
language school will not lead to discrimination against other citizens.
Under the constitution, therefore, the Slovak government should continue
to support and finance Hungarian language education at its present level.
Numerous provisions of international documents concern the
education of national minorities. Under the League of Nations system,
several treaties contain paragraphs specifically providing for the use of
minority language instruction. The Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919, as
well as similar treaties in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania,
provide that minorities "shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and
control at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institutions,
schools and other educational establishments with the right to use their own
language and exercise their religion freely therein."11 6  This paragraph
obliged states to establish minority language schools in areas inhabited by
minorities and to finance these institutions on a proportional basis. 7 In
Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, the Permanent Court of
International Justice examined Article 9 of the Polish Minorities Treaty."8
This article ensured that adequate primary instruction facilities would be
provided to non-Polish speaking nationals. The court held that such a
provision represented the right of "minorities, the members of which are
citizens of the state, to enjoy . . . amongst other rights, the equality of
rights . . . in matters relating to primary education."' 79  The Permanent
Court again reinforced the provision of minority language education in the
Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania.' The Court held:
[p]rovisions will be made in the public educational system
in towns and districts in which [there] are resident a
considerable proportion of Albanian nationals whose
mother-tongue is not the official language, for adequate
facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools
instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals,
through the medium of their own language, it being
understood that this provision does not prevent teaching of
176. See supra note 121.
177. Id. at 96.
178. Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig (1932), P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, 1.
179. Id. at 9.
180. Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, 1935, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64,
3, at 21. This opinion examined the validity of an Albanian law aimed at abolishing all private
schools operating within the state.
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the official language being made obligatory in the said
schools. "
In the Belgian Linguistic Case,12 the European Court of Human
Rights held that ECHR, Protocol 1, Article 2 did not impose an affirmative
duty on states to ensure, at their own expense, or subsidize education of a
particular type. Article 2 only implies the right to "avail themselves of the
means of instruction existing at a given time."" 3  Article 2, therefore,
concerns the freedom of education, not a social or cultural right to
education. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it is not per se
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity under Article 14 to limit the
number of languages in which instruction is given in state sponsored
schools.
The holding of the court in the Belgian Linguistics Case is
pragmatic. It has been asserted that it would be unrealistic to mandate that
a state provide full funding for every linguistic minority, regardless of their
numbers, schooling in their respective minority language. A pure minority
language educational system could be an unruly drain on state resources
and may result in decreasing the cumulative quality of education on a
national level. However, these adverse consequences may not hold true in
Slovakia, where the Hungarian minority is heavily concentrated in one
region. This demographic situation eases the hardships relating to the
provision of minority language schooling. Since 1968, when the Belgian
Linguistics Case was decided, the right to minority language education has
been codified in numerous international human rights documents. It is
possible that the Belgian Linguistics Case would be decided differently in
light of the increasing emphasis placed upon the protection of linguistic and
cultural rights within the international legal framework.
The most relevant statement on minority language education is
Recommendation 1201 both because of its explicit discussion of minority
language education and its binding nature upon the Slovak government.
Recommendation 1201 was contained in the SHBT. The Slovak
government is thus obliged to respect the provisions contained in this
document. Recommendation 1201 Article 8(1) states:
[e]very person belonging to a national minority shall have
the right to learn his/her mother tongue and to receive an
education in his/her mother tongue at an appropriate
number of schools and of state educational and training
181. Id.
182. See supra note 134.
183. Id. at 31.
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establishments, located in accordance with the
geographical distribution of the minority.'"
The Slovak government did not issue any reservations limiting the effect of
this provision. Although the legal obligations under Recommendation
1201 have been debated,",s the Slovak government explicitly negotiated the
terms of the SHBT and should be held to the obligations created therein.
Under Recommendation 1201's terms, educational opportunities in the
Hungarian language should not be curtailed, particularly in the southern
region of Slovakia where the Hungarian minority is concentrated.
In addition to Recommendation 1201, the FCNM includes state
mandates to provide minority language education. FCNM Article 12(1)
articulates that state parties "shall, where appropriate, take measures in the
field of education and research to foster knowledge of the culture, history,
language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority."
The language of this provision reflects the importance attributed to the
education of national minorities about their respective cultures and
identities. FCNM Article 12(2) asserts that state parties "shall inter alia
provide adequate opportunities for teacher training and access to textbooks,
and facilitate contacts among students and teachers of different
communities." FCNM Article 12(3) obliges that states "undertake to
promote equal opportunities for access to education at all levels for persons
belonging to national minorities." Education is a means through which
individuals advance socially, intellectually, and economically. Given
evidence of the disproportionate representation of ethnic Hungarians in
higher education, the Slovak government, to comply with the dictates of
Article 12, should take active steps toward closing this gap in educational
achievement.
FCNM Article 14 specifically addresses the importance of an
individual belonging to a national minority group to learn his or her
minority language. Paragraph 1 states that parties to the signatory states
"undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national minority
has the right to learn his or her minority language." Paragraph 2 sets forth
the conditions under which education is to be provided in minority
languages. The clause asserts that:
[i]n areas inhabited by persons belonging to national
minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if there
184. See supra note 61, Recommendation 1201 art. 8(1).
185. See generally (Opinion on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights Appended to Recommendation 1201 of the
Parliamentary Assembly, Venice Commission), CDL-INF (96) 4, Mar. 22, 1996. This opinion
is discussed in greater detail in the section on Slovakia's territorial division legislation, infra.
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is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavor to ensure,
as far as possible and within the framework of their
education systems, that persons belonging to those
minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the
minority language or for receiving instruction in this
language. "6
Similar to FCNM Article 10(2), Article 14(2) includes the condition that
sufficient demand from persons belonging to a national minority be
expressed before instruction in minority languages is provided. This
phrase, however, is left undefined. Beyond purely demographic
consideration of whether sufficient demand for Hungarian language
schooling exists, political tensions in the region and the historic presence
of Hungarian speakers in southern Slovakia are also relevant factors to be
considered in this determination. 7 The words as far as possible indicate
that the allocation of state expenditure to minority language institutions is
contingent upon the state's financial resources. The FCNM provisions
dealing with minority language education and instruction are worded
flexibly to allow individual states to determine the appropriate level of
funding in light of its particular circumstances. Mr. Heinrich Klebes of
the Council of Europe commented that:
[t]he alternative referred to in [Paragraph 2] "opportunities
for being taught the minority language or for receiving
instruction in this language" - are not mutually exclusive.
Even though Article 14 paragraph 2 imposes no duty upon
states to do both, its wording does not prevent the state
Parties from implementing the teaching of the minority
language as well as the instruction in the minority
language. Bilingual instruction may be one of the means
of achieving the objective of this provision. The obligation
arising from this paragraph could be extended to pre-
school education.,u
Article 14(3) recognizes that knowledge of the official language is
a factor of social cohesion and integration. 9 Overall, the wording is
tentative and evidences unease at the prospect of recognizing the right to
minority language education. This hesitancy is largely derived from the
186. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 14, para. 2.
187. See DE VARENNES, supra note 128, at 205.
188. See DE VARENNES, supra note 128.
189. "Paragraph 2 of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the learning of
the official language or the teaching in this language." See FCNM supra note 71, art. 14(3).
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need to balance the desire to integrate minority groups into the society of
the state concerned and the need to preserve minority culture and
language.190
Beyond the obligations contained in Recommendation 1201 and the
FCNM, numerous international instruments embody the growing trend in
human rights law to provide, to a varying degree, the right to education in
one's mother tongue. The Convention Against Discrimination in
Education Article 519, states that:
[t]he state parties to this Convention agree that...
(c) it is essential to recogni[z]e the right of members of
national minorities to carry on their own educational
activities, including the maintenance of schools and,
depending on the educational policy of each state, the use
or the teaching of their own language ....
Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 29
provides that:
1. State parties agree that the education of the child shall
be directed to...
(c) the development of respect for the child's parents, his
or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the
national values of the country in which the child is living,
the country from which he or she may originate, and for
civilizations different from his or her own .... 192
The Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional of
Minority Languages also provides for minority language education in
Article 8.1"3 Article 8 offers several options for the allocation of education
in the relevant regional or minority language at the pre-school, primary
school, secondary level, technical and vocational education, university and
adult educational level. Section (g) and (h) of this article provide for the
training of teachers in minority languages and for the teaching of minority
190. Notably, the ECHR is silent on this issue.
191. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec. 14, 1960, 429
U.N.T.S. 93.
192. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.G.A. Res. 25 (XLIV), 44 U.N. GAOR
(Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989).
193. See generally European Charter for Regional of Minority Languages, Council of
Europe, Strasbourg, Nov. 5, 1992.
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history and culture. Provision for minority language instruction is again
contained in the EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of
Regional and Ethnic Minorities.," This Resolution recommends, in
paragraph 5, that:
[M]ember states . . carry out educational measures
including: arranging for pre-school to university education
and continuing education to be officially conducted in the
regional and minority languages in the language areas
concerned on an equal footing with instruction in the
national languages, . . . giving particular attention to the
training of teaching staff in the regional or minority
languages and making available the educational resources
required to accomplish these measures, promoting
information and resources on educational opportunities in
the regional and minority languages .... 9
Education in one's mother tongue, particularly during primary
schooling, is one of the most effective ways of teaching young children. If
a child speaks Hungarian at home and enters a Slovak-only language
school upon the age of six, foreign language education could produce
negative affects on the child. In areas of Slovakia where ethnic
Hungarians comprise the vast numerical majority, a child is continually
exposed to the Hungarian language in the home, on the streets, and in local
shops. Entering into an educational institution that teaches in the state
language may logically produce feelings of anxiety, inferiority, and
discomfort. UNESCO studied the impact of foreign language education
and concluded that "[t]o expect [a child] to deal with new information or
ideas presented to him [sic] in a familiar language is to impose on him a
double burden, and he will make slower progress."'1' This view was
reinforced in the South West Africa Case (Second Phase), where Judge
Tanaka of the International Court of Justice commented that "if we
consider education . . . we cannot deny the value of vernacular as the
medium of instruction[.]" 1'9
194. Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities
(European Union) European Parliament, Strasbourg, Oct. 30, 1987. Reprinted in DE VARNNES,
supra note 128, at 299.
195. Id. para. 5.
196. UNESCO, THE USE OF VERNACULAR LANGUAGES IN EDUCATION 691 (1953).
197. 284 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 6. (July 1966) Several studies have been
conducted which support the conclusion that non-mother tongue education correlates with poor
educational results, psychological inferiority, and may even provide a basis for ethnic tension.
See generally Steven Rosnbaum, Educating Children of Immigrant Workers: Policies in France
and the USA, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 455 (1981); Karl A. Deustach, THE POSTAL
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Alternative education should be considered an additional
educational opportunity for ethnic Hungarians. As higher education in the
Slovak Republic is available almost exclusively in the Slovak language,
ethnic Hungarians must develop knowledge of the state language in order
to pursue advanced careers. By widening the selection of educational
options available for ethnic Hungarians, the alternative education plan
could provide benefits to the minority community. The projected benefits
of alternative education can only be reaped if the element of choice is
extant in the system. Otherwise the alternative education plan, together
with positive discrimination in favor of ethnic Slovak teachers and pressure
on pupils to incline towards more Slovak options, constitutes a blatant
attempt to assimilate children of the ethnic Hungarian community into the
Slovak nation. '
It is a difficult task for the Slovak government to create an
educational system that will satisfy the needs of both Hungarians and
Slovaks in ethnically commingled areas. While Hungarians must be
offered an education in their own language, they should also be given the
possibility to learn sufficient Slovak to prepare them for university studies
and for coexistence in a multilingual state. Although the importance of
learning Slovak should not be underestimated, Hungarian language schools
on all levels must be made available to all who wish a unilingual,
Hungarian education.' The desirable level of Slovak mastery is a question
to be answered by each individual (or parent) for his or herself.2 The role
of minority language education in Slovakia should not be underestimated.
Multilingual abilities must be viewed as an asset in Slovakia. The policy
of the Slovak government should be one of generosity towards the
Hungarian minority. This is particularly true given Slovakia's
commitments under international law. As language is the primary
distinctive feature of ethnic Hungarians, education in the Hungarian
language is vital to the preservation of Hungarian cultural identity.
SIGNIFICANCE OF LINGUISTIC CONFILICTS (Savard & Vigneault, eds., Les Etats multilingues 14
(1975); STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION, U.N. PUBLICATION 90, cited with approval
in DE VARENNES, supra note 128, at 194.
198. FCNM art. 5(2) states: "Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their
general integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at
assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these
persons from any action aimed at such assimilation." See FCNM supra note 71, art. 5(2)
199. See, e.g., the possibilities for the Swedish minority in Finland to study law or
medicine in the Swedish language.
200. See Justification supra note 122. "The state ... is required to establish the conditions
for, and must strive to insure that, every citizen be able to master the language in which he can
make himself understood in the entire territory of the state[.]"
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3. Territorial Divisions
In July 1996, despite wide criticism and a presidential veto, the
Slovak parliament passed a controversial territorial division measure that
geographically and administratively reconfigured the country's political
map. The law expands the number of districts from thirty-four to seventy-
nine and increases the number of regions from four to eight. In addition,
parliament approved a measure that reorganizes state administration at the
regional and district level, mandating that a state administrator be
appointed in each region. This administrator then appoints an
administrator for each district. Each district state administrator can then
appoint all of the members of the district state administrative board.°'
The territory division law stretches the regions of Slovakia from
north to south, thus weakening the voting power of the Hungarian minority
by splitting Slovakia's southern region, where most ethnic Hungarians
reside, into several new and smaller districts. The territorial division plan
leaves an ethnic Hungarian majority in only two of the seventy-nine newly
approved districts.- Successful passage of the territorial arrangement plan
resulted in the center of gravity of each of the regions being placed in
central Slovakia, longitudinally. Ethnic Hungarians must now travel to
distant locations to conduct administrative business. In addition, there is a
greater likelihood that ethnic Hungarians will encounter officials who do
not speak Hungarian. This is in contrast to the bilingual abilities of most
officials in southern Slovakia.
While government officials assert that the reorganization measures
are a means of giving more administrative power to local authorities,
opposition politicians criticize the plan as reminiscent of communist-style
central rule where party members regulate local affairs. Rather than direct
election of local officials by the local population, this regime allows
regional and district heads to be appointed by the state government.
Refuting the government's claims of local empowerment, Democratic Left
Vice-Chairman Peter Weiss remarked that "[d]ecentralization is when the
state transfers a part of its powers to elected municipal governments and
makes sure those are adequately financed from taxes collected in the
region." 203 Ethnic Hungarians believe that the territorial reorganization is a
201. See Jana Dorotkova, Law Carves Slovakia Into More Regions, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 17 - 30, 1996, at 3.
202. Statement of the Hungarian Civic Party, Mar. 27, 1996.
203. Id. Opposition parties speculate that the territorial arrangement may serve to secure a
HZDS victory in the upcoming elections in 1998. At the HZDS Congress held in March 1996,
Meciar articulated the benefits of changing the Slovak electoral system from a proportionate
system to that of a majority system, thereby creating two leading political rivals in an effort to
stabilize the Slovak political scene.
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gerrymandering device aiming to create new districts to ensure HZDS and
SNS victories in future elections.
This legislative measure may be a response to increasing calls for
ethnic Hungarian cultural, educational, and territorial autonomy.
Following the first government proposal for altering the territorial
arrangement in January 1994, ethnic Hungarians held a controversial
meeting in the southern city of Komarno. This meeting resulted in
demands for a territorial division plan based on ethnic composition. The
Hungarian proposal aimed at decentralizing the state by delegating more
power to regional and local authorities in predominantly Hungarian as well
as Slovak regions.2 The Slovak government assessed the proposal as a
step in the direction of a secession of majority Hungarian territories.
Territorial self-rule would grant "autonomy for a region that would very
quickly join the Hungarian mother state. The creation of a greater
Hungary is the dream of ethnic Hungarian politicians . . . ." asserted
Zdenka Anettova of the Slovak cultural organization, Matica Slovenska.- 5
Government resistance to full autonomy stems from the fact that in all
areas where Hungarians constitute an ethnic majority, ethnic Slovaks are a
minority. To hand over all decision making power to local authorities,
therefore, is not politically feasible. The current Slovak government is
likely to resist requests for any form of autonomy because it would
decentralize HZDS's centralized political control. The prospect of local
self-government in southern Slovakia prompted the Slovak government to
counter the influence of elected representatives by replacing government
officials with SNS party members throughout the region. Such activity has
reversed the results of democratic elections.
The Hungarian political parties all, to varying degrees, support
greater decision making power for minorities; be it in the shape of
decentralization or a form of minority autonomy. Coexistence, which has
taken the most radical stand on the issue, supports the creation of self-
governing territorial units. MKDH strives to ensure "autonomy in the
minority culture and education."- ° In 1994, however, MKDH rejected the
concept of territorial autonomy in favor of cultural autonomy. Mr. Gyula
Bardos, a MKDH parliament member stated:
[iun the current confrontational atmosphere, many political
representatives see autonomy as something evil, negative,
204. See Statement of Convention of Local Government Representatives, Mayors and
Members of Parliament from Southern Slovakia, issued in KoMARNO, Jan. 8, 1994.
205. Zdenka Anettova, Should Ethnic Hungarians Receive Autonomy?, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 11.
206. Information provided by MKDH.
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or even dangerous, jeopardizing the territorial integrity of
the Slovak Republic . . . Some people claim that
autonomy, or self-administration, is a tool to join the
territory of southern Slovakia to Hungary. This is a lie.
We are not questioning the borders, we do not want to join
anyone. We only want decisions about us not to be made
without us. In theory, according to the Constitution, we
have the right to participate when matters concerning
national minorities and ethnic groups are being decided.
But in practice, there are no laws and regulations that
would guarantee us effective participation in the decision
making and control process.w
The Hungarian Civic Party has taken a far less radical stance on the issue
of autonomy than the other parties. The Hungarian Civic Party
recommends decentralization efforts and plebiscites to decide the names of
towns, a very contentious issue that is discussed in greater detail below.
Ethnic Hungarian parties, by promoting this issue, have become suspect
even in the eyes of the more moderate political parties and are therefore
finding it difficult to have any kind of cooperation with the other parties on
a national level.- The cause of the Hungarian minority, ironically, has
been harmed by the more radical positions held by members of the
Hungarian coalition. The most commonly suggested form of self-
government is the simple decentralization of power in Slovakia, both in
Slovak and Hungarian regions. Functional self-government in matters of
culture and education is another suggested form of autonomy. Functional
self-government would allow Hungarian schools to be operated by
Hungarian boards, while Slovak schools would stay under Slovak control.
Ratification of the SHBT re-agitated the debate on self-government
for ethnic Hungarians. The SHBT contained a binding provision regarding
local or autonomous authorities. SHBT 15(4)(b) states: "[The State
Parties] shall apply . . . as legal obligations . . . Recommendation of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe No. 1201 (1993),
respecting individual human and civil rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to national minorities." Recommendation 1201 Article
11 stipulates that:
[I]n the regions where they are in a majority, the persons
belonging to a national minority shall have the right to
207. Gyula Bardos, Should Ethnic Hungarians Receive Autonomy?, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 11.
208. See generally Sharon Fisher, Ethnic Hungarians Back Themselves Into a Corner,
TRANSITION, Dec. 29, 1995.
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have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous
authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific
historical and territorial situation and in accordance with
the domestic legislation of the state.
The treaty was passed by the Slovak parliament only because the ratified
version included a restricting clause limiting the effect of Recommendation
1201 Article 11. The restricting clause stated that:
[tihe Government of the Slovak Republic emphasizes that it
has never accepted and has not enshrined in the treaty any
formulation that would be based on the recognition of the
principle of collective rights for the minorities and that
would admit the creation of autonomous structures on
ethnic principle. It insists that it has agreed to mention the
Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe No. 1201 (1993) exclusively with the
inclusion of the restricting clause: 'respecting individual
human and civil rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to national minorities.
Memorandum and addendum issued unilaterally by a government
pertaining to the interpretation of a bilateral treaty does not have any effect
under international law. Nevertheless, the interpretation clause has a
significant effect on political culture in Slovakia. The pronouncement
serves to reinforce the absolute opposition of the government to any
accommodation for the self-governance of the Hungarian minority.
Recommendation 1201 Article 11 was the subject of study in
March 1996 by the Venice Commission, a group of experts appointed by
the Council of Europe. The Commission concluded that Article 11 should
be interpreted very cautiously and that the right of national minorities to
local or autonomous authorities "is possible only in the presence of a
binding instrument of international law." 210 Article 11 does not support a
collective right to local self-government, but rather asserts the right of
individual members of a national minority group to exercise the rights
provided in association with others. Article 11 neither defines the three
209. Statement of the Slovak Government, Mar. 18, 1996 quoted in Heinrich Klebes, The
Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 92, 96 n.21. Interestingly, prior to its admittance into the Council of Europe, the
Slovak Parliament passed a resolution stating that the Slovakia's policy on the protection of its
national minorities was based on the principles contained in Recommendation 1201. See
generally Slovak National Council, Resolution 295, June 23, 1993.
210. Opinion on the Interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights Appended to Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly,
Venice Commission, CDL-INF (96) 4, Mar. 22, 1996, at 5.
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means of autonomy enumerated, "local or autonomous authorities or to
have a special status," nor proscribes a model for fulfilling obligations
created therein. Although Recommendation 1201 may not entitle the
Hungarian minority to autonomous authorities, the direction of the
Recommendation is clear. Recommendation 1201 seeks to encourage state
parties to allocate sufficient power to local authorities in regions heavily
populated by members of national minority groups. This allocation would
result in the interests of national minorities being reflected in government.
By implementing legislation that takes elective control of local
representatives out of the hands of the local population, the Slovak
government has acted in violation of the spirit of Recommendation 1201.
While the right to local autonomy is not settled under international
law, the right to effective participation in a civil society is widely accepted.
Ethnic Hungarian calls for autonomy have been in response to the
perceived deterioration of minority voting power and representation in
government. This situation could be remedied through other means, such
as by passage of a law that truly decentralizes state administration. The
FCNM, while not providing a legal right to local autonomy, does
guarantee the right to effective participation of members of national
minority groups in public affairs. 2" FCNM Article 15 states: "The Parties
shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of
persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic
life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them." 212 Although
no reference is made to local authorities, the territorial arrangement now in
effect in the Slovak Republic denies ethnic Hungarians of this right.
FCNM Article 16 also concerns the minority participation in government.
This article states that, "The parties shall refrain from measures which
alter the proportions of the populations in areas inhabited by persons
belonging to national minorities and are aimed at restricting the rights and
freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework
convention."2 '3 The Explanatory Report accompanying the FCNM lists as
examples of such measures not just "expropriations, evictions, and
expulsions," but also "redrawing administrative borders with a view to
restricting the enjoyment of such rights and freedoms." 2 4 Redrawing the
regions and districts of Slovakia has infringed on the right to effective
participation in public affairs. The effectiveness of Hungarian participation
in public affairs is diminished if administrative contacts are conducted in a
211. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 15.
212. Id.
213. Id. art. 16.
214. FCNM, Explanatory Report. See generally FCNM supra note 71.
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language other than one's mother tongue and far from their homes. None
of the measures recommended to state parties by the FCNM Explanatory
Report to enhance minority participation have been taken in Slovakia. 5
The principle of effective participation of members of national
minority groups is further referenced in IPNM Article 21. This article
provides that: "in accordance with the policies of the states concerned,
states will respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to
effective participation in public affairs, in particular in decisions affecting
the areas where they live or in the matters affecting them." The
effectiveness of Hungarian participation at all levels of government is
diminished by the territorial division law's prohibition against the election
of regional state administrators, local district administrators, and the
district state administration board members. By forcing members of the
Hungarian minority to travel farther distances to reach the administrative
center of their respective regions, Hungarian's interests are less likely to
be represented or acknowledged because of the increased distance from
predominantly Hungarian territories. These results are in contrast to
Recommendation 1201, the FCNMs provisions, and the IPNM.
The role of local and regional authorities is particularly important
in a state emerging as a democracy after decades of centralized, communist
rule. The principles encompassed in the European Charter of Self-
Government, while not binding on the Slovak Republic, should be
instructive.116  This Charter outlines a framework to be followed in
establishing forms of local self-government. The preamble stresses that:
[local authorities are one of the main foundations of any
democratic regime; [c]onsidering that the right of citizens
to participate in the conduct of public affairs is one of the
democratic principles that are shared by all member states
215. Parties could promote ... inter alia the following measures:
-consultation with these persons, by means of appropriate procedures and, in
particular, through their representative institutions, when Parties are contemplating
legislation or administrative measures likely to effect them directly;
-involving these persons in the preparation, implementation and assessment of national
and regional development plans and programmes likely to effect them directly;
-undertaking studies, in conjunction with these persons, to assess the possible impact
on them of projected development activities;
-effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in the decision
making processes and elected bodies both at national and local levels;
- decentralised or local forms of government.
See Klebes, supra note 1, at 101.
216. See generally European Charter of Local Self-Government, 1985 Europ. T.S. No.122
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of the Council of Europe; [c]onvinced that it is at the local
level that this right can be most directly exercised;
[c]onvinced that the existence of local authorities with real
responsibilities can provide an administration which is both
effective and close to the citizen; [a]ware that the
safeguarding and reinforcement of local self-government in
the different European countries is an important
contribution to the construction of a Europe based on the
principles of democracy and decentralization of power;
[a]sserting that this entails the existence of local authorities
endowed with democratically constituted decision making
bodies and possessing a wide degree of autonomy with
regard to their responsibilities, the ways and means by
which those responsibilities are exercised and the resources
required for their fulfillment .... 21
Article 3(1) defines the concept of local self-government as follows:
"Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local
authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a
substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the
interests of the local population. "218 The options outlined in the Charter are
particularly appropriate for the states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Implementing measures aimed at increasing local democracy, by
redistributing the historic powers held by the central government to
regional or local authorities, would enhance the right of minorities to
participate in local government. Slovak sovereignty would continue to be
respected under this scheme. This Charter provides a framework within
which states can arrange local authorities to maximize the participation of
members of national minority groups while preserving the young state's
territorial integrity. 29  Enhancing the role of local authorities in the
southern territory of Slovakia would grant ethnic Hungarians a greater
ability to express and promote their group identity.
The Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) adopted Resolution 250 (1993): "on the
adoption of local and regional self-government in Central and Eastern
European countries. " 2 In order to facilitate the development of local and
regional democratic institutions, CLRAE made several recommendations.
217. Id., preamble.
218. Id. art. 3(1).
219. Id. art. 5.
220. COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S CONGRESS OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES OF
EUROPE RES. 250 (1993) [hereinafter CLRAE].
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Some of the actions CLRAE encouraged include: 1) respecting the
autonomy of local and regional authorities, 2) supporting cooperation
among local and regional authorities, 3) promoting the election of regional
authorities, and 4) financing these institutions at such a level as to facilitate
their effectiveness.Y' The Slovak government has not implemented any of
these suggestions. In fact, measures directly contrary to these suggestions
are currently operating to resist decentralization.
The EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional
and Ethnic Minorities recommends that:
[m]ember states . . . carry out administrative and legal
measures including: providing a direct legal basis for the
use of regional and minority languages, in the first instance
in the local authorities of areas where a minority group
does exist, . . . requiring decentralized central government
services also to use national, regional, and minority
languages in areas concerned ....
The Council of Europe's Recommendation 1134 also includes the
right of national minorities to "participate fully in decision making about
matters which affect the preservation and development of their identity and
in the implementation of those decisions .. . ." Furthermore, the Report
of Experts on National Minorities23 by the OSCE states in paragraph II
that: "[The participating states] reconfirm that persons belonging to
national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and
develop their culture in all aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation
against their will." The Experts noted, inter alia, the positive results
obtained through the use of 1) local and autonomous administration
including territorial autonomy, 2) decentralization, and 3) advisory and
decision making bodies in which minorities are represented.-2
The impact of the territorial division legislation has yet to be
assessed, but because the territorial delineation makes Hungarians the
minority in the overwhelming majority of districts, negative consequences
are soon to become apparent. The territorial division plan clearly
221. Id., see also PATRICK THORNBERRY ET AL., COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND MINORITIES
61, n.275 (1994).
222. European Parliament Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and
Ethnic Minorities, Strasbourg, para. 6, (Oct. 30, 1987), reprinted in DE VARENNE, supra note
128, at 299.
223. Report of Experts on National Minorities, Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (now the OSCE), Geneva, July 19, 1991.
224. Id.
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diminishes the presence of Hungarian voters in all districts, but in addition,
the plan also reduces the strength of the minority's ability to request
changes in other administrative services, such as the provision of bilingual
information. Wherever a minority constitutes a substantial percentage of
the population, its members shall have the right to use their own language,
dictates the FCNM. This condition is no longer fulfilled in a single district
due to the geographic manipulation of local districts under the territorial
division legisltion. Thus, the question must be asked whether the Slovak
government is deliberately attempting to circumvent its obligations under
the FCNM.
Some form of local self-government in southern Slovakia would
serve to ease ethnic tensions and perhaps restore a degree of faith in the
Slovak government to ethnic Hungarians. By refusing to consider this
alternative, the government has further agitated the minority population
with its hard-line resistance. Genuine democracy is premised upon the
participation of all individuals in the decision making processes of society.
Minorities exercise their basic rights at the local level, therefore, the
importance of adequate representation of national minorities cannot be
dismissed by the government. Articulation of the special concerns of the
ethnic Hungarian population, therefore, is vital to maintaining a democratic
state that respects all members of its society.
4. The Law on Names
According to Slovak grammar, female surnames add the suffix "-
ovd" in the nominative case. Hungarian grammar does not contain a
similar directive, therefore, any measure that imposes the "-ova" ending is
a highly sensitive issue among Hungarian women. Such a mandate is
viewed as a means of Slovakizing Hungarian names. On July 7, 1993, a
Law on Names and Surnames was passed by the Slovak Parliament.
Adding the "-ova" ending to one's last name was made compulsory for
Slovak citizens under the 1993 law, regardless of ethnicity. In addition,
the law prohibited the registration with authorities of non-ethnic Slovak
Christian names. Traditional Slovak names such as the first name "Jan"
could be registered as an official birth name, but the Hungarian
counterpart, "Janos," could not. This version of the law was in force until
1994, when the interim Moravcik government, under pressure from the
Council of Europe, drafted changes in the law making the female gender
suffix optional and including a provision accepting Hungarian Christian
225. For example, Mr. Kovacs versus Mrs. Kovacsova.
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names. The proposal was voted and approved by Parliament on May 27,
1994.226 This law remains in force in the Slovak Republic.2 17
Protection of ethnic names is pronounced in Recommendation 1201
Article 7(2), which articulates that: "[elvery person belonging to a
national minority shall have the right to use his/her surname and first name
in his/her mother tongue and to official recognition of his/her surname and
first names." The provisions contained in Recommendation 1201 are
directly binding on the Slovak government as they are incorporated into the
SHBT. As a result, the use of ethnic first and last names must be ensured
and protected by the Slovak government. In addition, state obligations
under the FCNM are clear with regard to the recognition of ethnic names
and surnames. FCNM Article 11(1) states that "[t]he Parties undertake to
recognize that every person belonging to a national minority has the right
to use his or her surname (patronym) and first names in the minority
language and the right to official recognition of them, according to
modalities provided for in their legal system." The right to use traditional
first names from the minorities' cultural sphere is likewise ensured by this
article. The IPNM also confirms official recognition of ethnic names.
Article 11 asserts that: "[a]ny person belonging to a national minority
shall have the right to use his/her surname and first names in his/her
language and the right to official acceptance and registration of such
surname and names." Furthermore, the EU's Resolution on the Languages
and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities recommends that member
states "officially recogni[ze] surnames . . . expressed in a regional or
minority language. "228
The CCPR contains, in Article 17, protection against arbitrary or
unlawful interference in one's private life. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee has held that this article protects the right to choose
one's own name.29 The Committee supported its conclusion by analyzing
the importance of one's name to the preservation of his or her identity. In
line with this ruling, ethnic Hungarian traditional names should be
respected and allowed.
226. On the occasion of the vote, the representatives of HZDS and SNS left the assembly
hall in protest.
227. The Language Law also contains a provision concerning the use of Slovak names.
Section 3(6) states that "[e]very citizen of the Slovak Republic has a right to alter, free of
charge, his first name and his family name into a Slovak orthographic form." Language Law of
Slovak Republic § 3(6). (The reverse administrative procedure is not free of charge).
228. See supra note 221.
229. Communication No. 453/1991, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. (Oct: 31, 1994), in which
two Dutch citizens sought to change their given surnames to Hindu names. The Dutch
authorities refused to process their request, and the parties filed a complaint under Article 17 and
18 of the CCPR.
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The provisions protecting the right to use traditional names are not
written in discretionary language; they do not contain restricting clauses.
Thus, under international human rights law, gender suffixes cannot be
imposed on citizens of a state. Linguistic minorities cannot be forced to
obey grammatical rules of the majority language. Respect for Hungarian
Christian names is not dependent on the state's resources, but rather on the
state's willingness to recognize the cultural diversity within its society.
The Hungarian language largely uses the same characters as the Slovak
alphabet and minor adjustments can easily be made to accommodate for
any differences. This accommodation involves little or no expense to the
government, but would be a symbolic gesture of deference to the minority.
The state has an unequivocal obligation under international law to provide
legislation (or administrative procedures) to grant the usage and state
recognition of minority language first names and surnames, including the
optionality of gender suffixes.
5. Bilingual Road Signs
Cities, towns and villages throughout southern Slovakia have
different names in Hungarian than in Slovak as a remnant of when
Hungary controlled the region. According to ethnic Hungarians inhabiting
this territory, location names should be posted in both the Slovak and
Hungarian languages. Currently, bilingual language road signs are posted
across southern Slovakia.
With the birth of the Slovak Republic in January 1993, measures
were taken to eliminate Hungarian or bilingual road signs. The Ministry
of Transportation issued a decree entitled, "Elimination of the Deficiencies
in the Vertical Road Signs," under which all bilingual road signs in
Slovakia were to be replaced by Slovak language postings by July 31,
1993. Protests ensued in the form of memoranda, demonstrations, and
obstruction of traffic in Hungarian-dominated villages. The Ministry
claimed that the decree promoted the normal supervision of road signs and
was in full accordance with Council of Europe recommendations. 20 The
measure was also allegedly intended to ensure the standardization of road
signs throughout Slovakia to comply with EU standards.
In 1993, the Council of Europe recommended that a law be
adopted to guarantee the posting of bilingual road signs. On January 28,
1994, a law concerning bilingual road signs in communities with large
percentages of minorities was defeated in Parliament by just three votes.
The law was redrafted to include a provision that communities with over
twenty percent of the population belonging to a minority should post
230. The motive was also forwarded that the Hungarian language road signs constituted a
hazardous distraction.
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bilingual signs. A law on bilingual road signs drafted by the interim Prime
Minister Moravcik was eventually passed by the Slovak Parliament.23' This
law is referenced in the Language Law's Article 3(3)(d):
[i]n the state language ... official names of municipalities
and their districts, denomination of the streets and other
public places, other geographical names, as well as the
data in the layout of the state map works, including the
land-registry maps, are conducted; denomination of
municipalities in other languages are regulated by a
separate law .... 232
By this language, the existing law on the use of bilingual road signs and
place names should not be overruled by the Language Law's provisions.
Recommendation 1201, as included in the SHBT, contains a
provision on this issue. Article 7(4) asserts that "[i]n the regions in which
substantial numbers of a national minority are settled, the persons
belonging to that minority shall have the right to display in their language
local names, signs, inscriptions and other similar information visible to the
public." This articulation of when and under what circumstances
Hungarian traditional names and signs can be displayed must be adhered to
in light of the binding nature of this document upon the Slovak
government. Members of the Hungarian minority are heavily concentrated
along the southern border of the state. Therefore, the substantial numbers
requirement is clearly met throughout this region.
The right of linguistic minorities to bilingual road signs is also
enshrined in the FCNM Article 11(3). This article asserts:
[i]n areas traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers of
persons belonging to a national minority, the Parties shall
endeavor, in the framework of their legal system,
including, where appropriate, agreements with other
States, and taking into account their specific conditions, to
display traditional local names, street names and other
topographical indications intended for the public also in the
minority language when there is a sufficient demand for
such indications.
The substantial numbers mentioned in this article are not specified.
However, in certain areas of Slovakia where the Hungarian population
surpasses twenty to eighty percent, the condition is clearly fulfilled.
231. Language Law of Slovak Republic, Law No. 191/1994.
232. Id. art. 3(3)d.
233. See generally FCNM supra note 71, art. 11(3).
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Sufficient demand is another unclear provision. Surveys indicate that this
condition is fulfilled. In one survey, ninety-six percent of ethnic
Hungarians stated that they wanted bilingual road signs.
In addition to the SHBT's Recommendation 1201 and the FCNM,
the IPNM recognizes the right of members of national minority groups to
the posting of bilingual local names. Article 14 provides that: "[iun
conformity with their national legislation states may allow, where
necessary through bilateral agreements with other interested states, the
displaying of bilingual ... local names . . in areas where the number of
persons belonging to a national minority reaches . . . a significant level."
Again, the significant level of persons belonging to a national minority
requirement is clearly met in the southern region of Slovakia. The posting
of bilingual signs is mandated by the bilateral friendship treaty ratified by
Slovakia and Hungary.
The EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional
and Ethnic Minorities recommends that member states "officially
recogni[ze] . place names expressed in a regional or minority
language." 235 Furthermore, in paragraph 9, the Resolution provides for the
"use of regional languages for road and other public signs in street
names."236 As Slovakia is seeking entry into the EU, adherence to these
principles is necessary to being granted member status. It is, therefore,
recommended that Slovakia continue to abide by the Resolution's
recommendations.
The issue of road signs is thus one of the few contentious issues
where the situation of the Hungarian minority has been settled in
accordance with international agreements, albeit through the arduous
negotiations of a previous government. In light of the binding nature of
Recommendation 1201, and its express provision relating to this issue, the
Slovak government should continue to respect the posting of bilingual
public signs. In addition, such action is supported by the FCNM, the
IPNM, and the EU's Recommendation on the Languages and Cultures of
Regional and Ethnic Minorities.
6. Mass Media
Perhaps the most alarming aspect of Slovak public life is
continuing government control of the mass media. . Since the 1994
parliamentary elections, the Slovak government has urged all media outlets
to report in an objective and neutral manner, namely, to limit government
234. See PETER HUNCIK ET AL., COUNTERPROOF 106 (1994).
235. See supra note 220
236. Id. para. 9.
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criticism.2" Two media oversight organizations, which many journalists
charge monitor and suppress anti-government media, have been
established: the Mass-Media Council and the Slovak Information Agency.
This policy has resulted in an antagonistic relationship, between the
government and the press.
Prime Minister Meciar has utilized the courts to stifle expression
and has replaced the heads of the state television, radio, and news agency
with his own political allies. In November of 1996, a Slovak court ordered
the leading Slovak opposition newspaper Sine, to apologize to and pay
cabinet ministers approximately $242,000 for publishing an article
criticizing the eighteen cabinet members . 2 8 The Slovak government has
been diligent in replacing individuals within media organizations who are
not explicitly friendly to HZDS with its own sympathizers. For example,
the appointed director of the Slovak Television (STV), the state-operated
television network, immediately canceled three popular programs with
political satires. He stated that television "cannot continue to be used to
offend the nation . . . [or] national institutions." 39  Slovak Radio and
TASR (a news agency) have been subjected to the same kind of
censorship.240
A graphic example of political interference with the development
of a free and independent press occurred in November 1996. Ms. Tatiana
Repkova was removed as editor-in-chief and publisher of Narodna
Obroda, an independent daily newspaper. Her termination occurred after
the newspaper published a Russian report stating that Prime Minister
Meciar was ill with a brain tumor. Narodna Obroda's owner, the VSZ
steel mill, meddled with the newspaper's editorial content and published an
apology to the Prime Minister without Ms. Repkova's knowledge or
consent. VSZ's directors and major shareholders of VSZ have close ties to
the Prime Minister, and the Slovak Minister for Transportation is one of
VSZ's owners. When Ms. Repkova sought assurance for VSZ that there
would be no further interference with the newspaper, she was dismissed as
editor and publisher. She was not given any reason for her termination.24'
237. See generally Sharon Fisher, Slovak Media Under Pressure, TRANSITION, Sept. 8,
1995.
238. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Opposition Daily Loses Slander Case, 216 OMRI DAILY
DIG. II (Nov. 7, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml >.
239. Id.
240. See generally REUTERS, Feb. 25, 1995.
241. See Jane Perlez, Dismissal of Slovak Editor Called Setback for Press Freedom, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1996, at A 15.
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Ms. Repkova's replacement was recently employed by the pro-government
regional daily, Luc.242
Slovakia's long-awaited media bill passed through the
government's legislative council in March 1996. If passed by Parliament
in its current form, the media bill would severely limit press freedom and
cause great financial hardship on the independent press. Monetary
penalties for violation of the law's provisions would be a maximum of one
million Slovak Crowns (approximately $33,220).24, The bill also requires
journalists to reveal their sources, a practice that is contrary to western
norms. In addition, the bill prohibits the publication of material that "in a
hidden or open way offends Slovak statehood, state symbols, [or] . . .
nationality.
The Slovak government has utilized a variety of means to maintain
substantial control over the media. Television, for example, has remained
largely within government control.2' 5 STV has been criticized for canceling
several popular political satire programs and for serving as a government
mouthpiece.
Radio licenses and newspapers are slowly passing into the hands of
government supporters. While privatization efforts continue, the
government has been criticized for favoring government sympathizers in its
privatization scheme.2" For example, the Board of Radio and Television
Broadcasting recently granted Radio Koliba a broadcast license. The co-
owner, Mr. Fedor Flasik, is reputed as having close ties with HZDS and
was one of the main organizers of the 1994 HZDS election campaign.74
More recently, this agency was granted a television license to replace the
frequencies freed by STV's second channel.' 8
The operation of Radio Free Europe was also threatened by the
Slovak government. On January 10, 1996, Slovakia's Board for Radio and
TV Broadcasting Chairman announced that Radio Free Europe would lose
242. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Roundup, 226 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Nov. 16, 1996) (last
visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.html>.
243. Id.
244. Anne Nivat, Slovak Media Under Government Fire, 2 TRANSITION, No. 9, May 3,
1996, at 60.
245. There is a private cable channel, VTV. Four out of the five owners of this channel are
loyal to the HZDS. Markisa is another private channel.
246. Vincent Boland, Political Feuding in Slovakia Obscures Economic Progress, THE FIN.
POST, Dec. 28, 1995, at 1.
247. Sharon Fisher, New Radio License Granted, 129 OMRI DAILY DIG II (July 3, 1996)
(last visited Oct. 28, 1997) < http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
248. Jiri Pehe, Another Private Nationwide TV Station Planned in Slovakia, 188 OMRI
DAILY DIGEST II (Sept. 27, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ
/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
1997]
98 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
its license, if it did not improve its news reporting within thirty days. The
openly admitted reason for threatening to cancel Radio Free Europe's
license is because the station is not perceived as reporting favorably to the
government. Director-General Dusan Kleiman of the SLOVAKIA Press
Agency alleged:
[t]he news reporting presented by this radio station is
unbalanced and non-objective. It is almost entirely
dominated by critical and negative material. This way of
informing the public diverges from the nature of a mass
media institution, which Radio Free Europe makes itself
out to be, as it is obviously performing the propaganda
purposes of certain political circles not leaning favorably
towards the current government and Slovakia.49
Journalists have also reported that they are being followed by the secret
police.-" Other journalists have been prosecuted for their reports25' or have
lost their positions shortly after expressing independent views. 2 2
In February 1995, Prime Minister Meciar announced that there
were too many newspapers in Slovakia, and that their number should be
diminished by a tax increase.22  The ensuing proposal would have
increased taxes for newspapers with foreign ownership. This provision
would have produced dire effects on opposition newspapers, which are
commonly owned by foreign agents. In response to this proposal, two-
thirds of Slovak daily newspapers- simultaneously published a blank front
page bearing the title, Anxiety. Perhaps as a result of this protest, the
measure failed to be approved by the Slovak Parliament.
249. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, Jan. 11, 1996. Despite these attacks,
Radio Free Europe's license was extended for 18 months on November 19, 1996. See Slovakia
Extends RFE/RL License, 225 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Nov. 20, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28,
1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
250. See generally THE PRAGUE POST, Dec. 27, 1995.
251. See Human Rights News Briefs from Slovakia, INT'L HELSINKI FED'N, Jan. 8, 1996.
252. See generally Sharon Fisher, Slovak Media Under Pressure, TRANSITION, Sept. 8,
1995.
253. In spite of the alleged shortage of funds for media matters and the stated superfluity of
newspapers, the government has provided funding for an entirely new daily, the Nova Zinena
Mladych. This newspaper, received somewhere between fifteen and fifty million Slovak Crowns
from the government. The newspaper's Editor-in-Chief was a former editor of Zinena, a weekly
widely criticized for anti-Semitic articles, and as his deputy was a former spokeswoman of the
SNS. The paper quickly established itself as staunchly nationalist, "anti-European" and faithful
to the government. This newspaper has since gone out of print. See generally THE PRAGUE
POST, Jan. 12, 1996.
254. See generally DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar. 6, 1995.
255. See NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1995.
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As of May 1995, Slovenska Republika, a daily newspaper partly
owned by HZDS and highly loyal to the same receives funds designated for
the minority press to publish supplements directed at minorities in minority
languages. This supplement often does not represent the interests of the
minority population. The allocation of public funds to a reputed nationalist
newspaper for coverage of issues affecting national minorities is
surprising, as it is unlikely that minority members read this paper.2 ' The
government ministries frequently support the Slovenska Republika by
regularly publishing advertisements in the daily.
Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians alike believe Slovak government
policies in this field are inappropriate. After only three months in office,
Prime Minister Meciar's government received a petition signed by over
100,000 Slovaks, which accused the government of violating freedom of
speech. 7 In a recent survey, 51.4% of the respondents expressed distrust
for Slovak Television. 8  The question as to whether the government
should control the activities of mass media was answered in the negative by
71.4% of the respondents. 9
The mass media issue is of concern to the Hungarian minority in
two ways: generally, a free press serves democracy and civil rights of
Hungarians and Slovaks alike; and specifically, the entities taking over the
media are manifestly nationalist and anti-Hungarian. Actions directed
against free mass media are making it increasingly difficult for Hungarian
spokespersons to express their views officially and to receive fair
coverage. Anti-Hungarian declarations receive full coverage and serve to
aggravate the ethmic relations. For example, on the eve of the December
parliamentary session that could have ratified the SHBT, STV repeatedly
broadcasted a documentary, titled Bloody Christmas, on Hungary's
occupation of southern Slovakia during World War II, cutting several times
to an interview with Mr. Miklos Duray, Chairman of the Coexistence
party. MKDH Chairman Bela Bugar noted:
[t]he coalition government has successfully created an anti-
Hungarian atmosphere among the people of Northern
Slovakia who don't have any contact with members of the
Hungarian minority ... In Liptovsky Mikulas [a northern
256. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Media Under Pressure, TRANSITION, Sept. 8, 1995.
257. See DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR Mar. 9, 1995.
258. Quoted in SME, Jan. 13, 1996.
259. Id.
260. There are, of course, Hungarian language or bilingual newspapers. Out of 871
Journals, dailies, weeklies and monthlies, 25 belong to this category. See Adresar Periodik a
Vidavatel'ov Slovenskej Republiky 1995, Novinarski Studijny Ustav, Bratislava 1995.
1997]
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
Slovak town], it was clear that sixty-five of the seventy
people in attendance at my speech left the room with the
feeling that "My God. So that is what the Hungarians
want. Now we don't have to be afraid of the Hungarians
anymore." [Slovak citizens living in Northern Slovakia]
don't know us. They are manipulated by Slovak television
and radio. It is through radio and television that northern
Slovak citizens hear about ethnic Hungarian. All they
receive is a biased image of us. 2'"
The confusion among the Slovak citizenry reflected in Mr. Bugar's
statement derives largely from the fact that disputes involving the
Hungarian minority are routinely featured in Slovak newspapers and on
television and radio. For example, when the Hungarian minority living in
Velky Kapusany wanted to build a memorial to commemorate the arrival
of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin 1,100 years ago, the event was
characterized as an act of separatism and turned into a media spectacle.
This issue was also debated in a session of Parliament.m In response to the
erection of a Hungarian monument on Slovak soil, the Slovak Parliament
approved a bill in July 1996 regulating state symbols. The measure
prohibits the public display of the Hungarian flag in Southern Slovakia
except during official visits by Hungarian officials. 6 3 Turning relatively
benign events into national political issues only serves to perpetuate fears
and stereotypes of the Hungarian minority. "Every week there is a
different issue: towns erecting Hungarian monuments, President Kovac
visiting Hungary, and the document from the conference in Budapest in
July of 1996. This strategy is employed to get the Slovak public to regard
us as troublemakers, an internal enemy," concluded Mr. Gyozo Bauer of
CSEMADOK. 264
The Language Law also regulates members of the Hungarian
minority's ability to broadcast Hungarian language programming. Section
5 of the Language Law seemingly precludes all broadcasting of programs
in languages other than Slovak. Section 5(1) states that "[r]adio and
television broadcasting is, on the whole territory of the Slovak Republic,
conducted in the State language." This general preclusion exempts
261. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, MKDH Chairman, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
262. See generally No Agreement in Kapusany, PRAVDA, June 18, 1996, at 2.
263. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Government Approves Bill on State Symbols, 144 OMRI
DAILY DIG. II, Part II (July 26, 1996)(last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
264. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996)
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broadcasting in the languages of national minorities by specific legislation.
The ambiguity of the Language Law, however, may provide a pretext for
interpretations detrimental to minority rights, as the current leadership of
STV is manifestly nationalist and anti-Hungarian. By specific legislation,
the broadcasting of minority language programs is permissible. The
Slovak Television Act of 1993 asserts that "Slovak Television provides
also for implementation of the interests of nationalities and ethnic
minorities living in the Slovak Republic through [sic] the television
broadcasting in their mother tongues."26 The Radio and Television
Broadcasting Operation Act of 1993 commits the operators of media outlets
to "produce or let produce a significant part of the programs broadcast so
that the cultural identity of the nation, nationalities and ethnic groups of the
Slovak Republic could be preserved and developed .... "266 The content,
perspective, and quality of minority language programs are not ensured by
this legislation.
The Language Law regulates media aimed at young audiences in
Section 5(2). This section outlaws the production and broadcasting of
children's television programs in any language other than Slovak.
Language Law Section 5(2) reads: "[a]udio-visual works of art intended
for children up to twelve years of age must be dubbed into the state
language." This provision, although primarily aimed at Czech television
programs, negatively affects Hungarian children as television is an
important means of instruction in the pre-school years and thereafter.
Currently, there are no Hungarian language children's programs besides
those accessed via Hungarian national television channels.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 17 states that
"[sitate Parties shall ... . encourage the mass media to have particular
regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group.
." This encouragement is clearly not present in Slovakia. In fact, such
activity is precluded by Language Law Section 5(2). Children of
Hungarian nationality are forced to learn Slovak in order to understand
television programs. While this is a legitimate governmental objective, the
Slovak government should provide options for Hungarian children and
their parents. Under the Language Law, not even a local channel would be
able to broadcast children's programs in the Hungarian language. The
Language Law provision precludes Hungarian children from hearing their
language spoken on Slovak television. The Slovak Republic cannot, given
the Language Law, fulfill its obligation of encouraging the mass media to
265. The Slovak Television Act, Law No. 271/1993, § 3(3), SL of the Slovak National
Council.
266. The Radio and Television Broadcasting Operation Act, Law No. 268/1993, (2), SL of
the Slovak National Council.
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provide for the needs of ethnic Hungarian children as mandated in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Television is an important means for the development of children's
culture and cultural education. FCNM Article 5(1) states that the "Parties
undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture .... " This
provision includes consideration for minority children. The prevailing
policy in Slovakia is an effective means of assimilation of Hungarian
minority children into the Slovak nation. Article 5(2) provides that:
[w]ithout prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general
integration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed
at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will
and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such
assimilation. '" 6 7  Furthermore, FCNM Article 9 ensures that national
minorities not be discriminated against in their access to the media. This
article prohibits governmental hindrance of the creation or use of the
printed media, radio or television by persons belonging to national
minorities. Due to the restrictiveness of the Language Law, all of these
referenced obligations are in question.
A free media in a democratic society operates independent of
government directives and pressures. It serves to objectively inform the
public of current events and proposed government policies. These
objectives are severely hampered by a government that strictly scrutinizes
and punishes media outlets that are deemed unfriendly. Through use of the
courts, questionable privatization methods, and political appointments to
important media positions, the Slovak government has effectively stifled
the media's ability to objectively educate the Slovak public about domestic
events. This control negatively affects the Hungarian minority.
Government interests reflected in the media often contain anti-Hungarian
biases. As a result, Hungarians are perceived as dangerous by Slovak
citizens. The restrictiveness of the Language Law also operates to
preclude the broadcasting of minority language programs, a service that is
vital to the preservation of Hungarian culture in Slovakia. The Slovak
government must respect the operation of a free press within its state, even
if the media reports are unfavorable to government policy. In addition,
minority language programs and media services should be honored as a
means to respect the cultural diversity present within Slovakia.
267. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 5(2).
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7. Minority Culture
A striking aspect of Slovak government policy toward the state's
national minorities is its failure to support minority culture, particularly
Hungarian. This area is one of the most crucial to the survival of
Hungarian cultural identity within Slovak borders. Over the past three
years, funding for Hungarian culture has plummeted from 140.5 million
Slovak crowns to zero. This situation resulted from changes in the state
funding mechanism for cultural activities. In 1995, the Slovak government
decided to grant decision making power over minority culture to the Pro
Slovakia fund."a  Pro Slovakia, on a case-by-case basis, reviews
applications for funding from the various cultural organizations in Slovakia
and determines funding allotments based on specific proposals. As a
result, the budget for Hungarian cultural organizations has been drastically
reduced and the vast majority of proposals have been denied by Pro
Slovakia.2 9
The board of trustees of Pro Slovakia is appointed by the Ministry
of Culture and the identities of the trustees are kept secret. The
government justifies the members secrecy by asserting that this set-up
prevents undue pressure from being exerted upon trustees. Pro Slovakia
has been criticized for favoring cultural organizations that promote the
Slovak culture at the expense of national minority culture. Pro Slovakia
granted 20.7 million Slovak crowns to the dailies Slovenska Republika and
Hlas ludu, a regional newspaper, for supplements aimed at ethnic
minorities. Members of minorities are less likely to be interested in these
newspapers, which have reputations for being staunchly Slovak nationalist
and government-faithful newspapers. A further 6.8 million Slovak crowns
were allocated to a project intended to make Slovak culture popular among
minorities. 270  Funds to minority culture, therefore, are being used to a
great extent to promote Slovak culture among minorities.
The centralized Hungarian cultural organization is CSEMADOK.
This organization has traditionally distributed its lump sum budget from the
government to finance smaller Hungarian cultural societies throughout
Slovakia. 27 ,' Last year, the Ministry of Culture refused to allocate any
money for CSEMADOK, accusing the organization of failing to report
268. A measure labeled unlawful by the Hungarian Coalition Parties, according to Slovak
laws on the distribution of powers.
269. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, in Samorin, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996).
270. See Some Facts on the Worsening Situation of the Hungarian Minority Living in
Slovakia, Evaluation by the Hungarian Coalition (Sept. 1995).
271. Interview with Mr. Gyozo Bauer, President of CSEMADOK, Bratislava, Slovakia
(July 16, 1996).
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how its finances were spent during the past budgetary year.272 Mr. Gyozo
Bauer, the President of CSEMADOK, explained:
[tihis accusation is only a front for the government's
refusal to support our organization. We submitted all of
our reports to the Ministry of Culture and to the OSCE
High Commissioner for National Minorities to prove the
government's accusation is false. If it was true, why
haven't I been arrested and tried in a court of law for
theft? No government official has asked us for any
paperwork or money. They only bring up this issue when
asked why they do not fund Hungarian culture. The
government is extremely afraid of CSEMADOK. We have
a fifty year history here. We survived the time when it
was illegal to even speak Hungarian . . . . It is the
government's policy to first destroy the centralized
organization because then there would be no one to support
the 500 community projects in the villages.273
The lack of government support for Hungarian culture has forced
organizations like CSEMADOK to rely on private support. Some finances
are obtained from Hungarian non-governmental organizations in Hungary
and other states. This support has prompted the Slovak government to
accuse Hungary of interfering with Slovakia's internal affairs. This
situation places ethnic Hungarian cultural societies in a precarious position.
The minority cannot rely on Slovak financial support for their cultural
activities, nor can they solicit funds from abroad without accusations of
threatening Slovak sovereignty. Mr. Arpad Ollos, former mayor of
Dunajska Streda, stated:
[w]hen Hungarians from Slovakia make contacts with
individuals or groups in Hungary, it is not a fight against
the Slovak state . . . Each time we make contact [with
Hungary], we are accused of nationalism. We are not part
of Hungary. The border will stay the same. These facts
are not questioned. We only want to be able to make and
maintain contacts with Hungary and not be accused of
being traitors .274
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Interview with Mr. Arpad Ollos, former major of Dunajska Streda, in Dunajska
Streda, Slovakia (July 11, 1996).
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The Slovak government's failure to support Hungarian culture in
Slovakia is contrary to guarantees contained in the Slovak Constitution, as
well as provisions enumerated in numerous international standards. Slovak
Constitution Article 34(1) asserts that "citizens of national minorities or
ethnic groups in the Slovak Republic shall be guaranteed their full
development, particularly the rights to promote their cultural heritage, ...
and create and maintain . . . cultural institutions. "25 If the Slovak
government supports cultural programs that promote Slovak cultural
identity, it has an obligation to also promote the cultural heritages of the
various minority groups within Slovak borders. To act otherwise would be
counter to the letter and spirit of the Slovak Constitution.
The FCNM's preamble states that a component of a truly
democratic society is respect for the cultural identity of each citizen. State
parties should "create appropriate conditions enabling individuals
belonging to a national minority to express, preserve, and develop this
identity[.] '" 21 FCNM Section II, Article 4(2) articulates the duty of a state
party to promote "full and effective equality" in cultural life between
ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority. Article 5(1) further obliges the
state party to "promote conditions necessary for persons belonging to
national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve
the essential elements of their identity, namely their . . . traditions and
cultural heritage." The EU's Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of
Regional and Ethnic Minorities recommends in paragraph 8 that member
states "ensur[e] that representatives of groups that use regional or minority
languages are able to participate directly in cultural facilities and activities
.... "277 The Council of Europe's Vienna Declaration on Human Rights,
Appendix II, states: "We, Heads of State and Government of the member
states of the Council of Europe, have agreed as follows, concerning the
protection of national minorities: ...States should create the conditions
necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to develop their
culture, while preserving their religion, traditions and customs." 2 7 8
A system that fails to support the vast majority of Hungarian
cultural activities, including folk dance troupes, literature, theater and
choruses, cannot be said to fulfill this undertaking. Encouraging these
cultural activities certainly do not threaten the Slovak nation. Such
activities can be pursued and still be compatible with the government's
general integration policy. By recognizing the importance of maintaining
275. See SLOVAK. CONST. art. 34(1).
276. See FCNM supra note 7 1, preamble, para. 7.
277. See supra note 221.
278. Id. at 303.
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Hungarian cultural heritage, Slovakia will fulfill its commitment to
promote a spirit of tolerance and cooperation among ethnic groups.
8. The Law on Foundations
The role of foundations and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) is a vital component to the maintenance of a civil and democratic
society. The importance of such organizations cannot be underestimated,
as they serve to direct public policy, review and comment on legislation,
and create a dialogue between the government and the public. The
existence of NGOs allows individuals to play an important role in all
spheres of public life by participating in the task of building a civil society.
In this arena, as with the private media, the Slovak government has
been reluctant to develop this independent sector. The emergence of
NGOs is perceived as a thorn in the side of the government's agenda. The
position of NGOs in Slovak society has been stunted by the recently
enacted Law on Foundations.27'9 After being once vetoed by President
Kovac and widely criticized by EU, United States, and United Nations
officials, this legislation was again passed by the Slovak Parliament in July
of 1996. This measure imposes strong governmental control over NGOs
and includes substantial monetary thresholds for qualification as a
recognized NGO. The basic start-up capital requirement is 10,000 Slovak
crowns (approximately $320). This amount must be increased to 100,000
Slovak crowns within six months in order for an organization to remain a
recognized foundation. The equivalent of $3200 in capital, this
requirement is an difficult threshold in a country with a per-capita income
of $2600. This requirement is applicable regardless of the size, purpose,
or needs of the organization. In addition, the Law on Foundations requires
that all foundations register with, and receive approval from, the Slovak
Ministry of Interior. The law also includes a prohibition against a
foundation's use of its resources to finance any political party activities or
financial support for a political movement.
While this law does not exclusively touch upon Hungarian
organizations, foundations play a large role in the solution of minority
problems given the absence of governmental activity in this area.U° For
example, the work of the Sandor Marai Foundation, a Hungarian
foundation, would be hindered by both the financial burdens of the law and
the provisions that indirectly limit permissible criticism of the government.
279. It was estimated that 500 foundations and associations existed prior to passage of the
Law on Foundations. Gallop and Kemp, Review and Recommendations: Proposed Slovak Law
on Foundations (prepared for the European Commission), May 10, 1996.
280. The organs and policies in place for solutions of minority issues in the CSFR have
been removed in the Slovak Republic.
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The Sandor Marai Foundation has developed training centers on ethnic
conflict resolution for ethnic Hungarian, Roma and Slovak communities.
As Mr. Peter Huncik, President of the Sandor Marai Foundation, asserted:
[t]he Law on Foundations has very serious implications for
our foundation. The [Sandor Maria Foundation] not only
works on trying to dissipate ethnic tensions, but also
supports Hungarian educational and cultural activities. We
publish an annual 'Global Report on Slovakia' which
analyzes the country's progress in twenty-two different
fields including minority relations, privatization,
education, and the environment. None of these activities
are supported by the government and, if the government is
able to increase their control over foundations, these
activities could be limited. But even more serious a
problem is the fate of smaller foundations doing vital
community work that are located outside of the cities.
They will not be able to survive the financial requirements
of the new law. The only purpose [of the law] is to control
foundations because we were getting too strong and
playing too large a role in society. So, the government
had to step in and try to keep us dependent. It is the
typical Bolshevik, paternalistic behavior that we have
endured for so long.
The fact that the power to define what constitutes a political cause
rests with a governmental body may produce dire effects on several
developing cultural and social advocacy organizations. For example, a
conference organized by an environmental foundation concerning clean air,
an awards ceremony developed by a Ruthenian organization, or a
symposium on domestic violence by a women's organization may be found
to be a political, and therefore prohibited act. This could inhibit the
democratic rights of individuals participating in NGOs by limiting the
ability of the public to express its views on social and political issues. In
addition, the approval requirement by the Slovak Ministry of Interior may
lead to the elimination of foundations that the government perceives, for
one reason or another, as undesirable. Given the antagonistic climate
between the Slovak government and ethnic Hungarian organizations, this
power may be wielded in a discriminatory manner.
FCNM Article 17(2) prohibits state parties from interfering with
the right of individuals to participate in local, regional, national and
international non-governmental organizations. This negative limitation on
the government's activity is not to be dismissed. Although the Law on
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Foundations does not prohibit the establishment of NGOs outright, it
certainly has the potential effect of limiting their presence and activities.
9. Draft Legislation
a) The Law on the Protection of the Republic
The Law on the Protection of the Republic was first passed by the
Slovak Parliament in March of 1996 and provoked immediate international
criticism. 28' This measure, which would amend the Criminal Code,
imposes stiff penalties for organizers of public rallies if the event is
deemed to be aimed at subverting the constitutional system, territorial
integrity or defense capability of the country.382 Under the law, Slovak
citizens could face up to two years in prison if found guilty of
"disseminating false information abroad damaging the interests of the
republic."23  For example, the offense of participation in public
demonstrations with the intent to overthrow the state carries a twelve year
prison sentence.2"
These amendments were broadly drafted and fail to articulate with
sufficient specificity what constitutes a violation. For example, under
Article 91 it is unclear who defines what constitutes "undermining the
country . . . ." Although the measure was passed by the Slovak
Parliament, it was vetoed by President Kovac in April 1996 and returned
to Parliament. In May 1996, Prime Minister Meciar said that debate on
the amendments would be delayed indefinitely because a "wider
democratic discussion" was needed to ensure the law's compliance with
international human rights conventions. m This assessment is certainly
true, as the potential for arbitrary interpretation and abuses appear to be
substantial and could result in criminal prosecution based on political
beliefs. HZDS placed the amendments on the parliamentary agenda this
fall. Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Gasparovic told the press on the eve of
the new parliamentary session that although he had abstained from voting
for the measure in March, if he had "known what would happen later
during the [July] Budapest conference [where ethnic Hungarian autonomy
281. Officials from the EU and the United States Department of State expressed concern
that the law could restrict freedom of speech, assembly and expression. The day after the
amendments were passed, an EU delegation met with Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk to
lodge a formal expression of concern about the measure. See Joe Cook, Slovak Law Threatens
Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 12, 1996, at 013.
282. The Law on the Protection of the Republic, art. 92.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See generally PRAVDA, May 9, 1996.
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was proposed] . . ., [he] would have probably pushed the 'yes' button." 286
Despite Mr. Gasparovic's support, the amendments were again removed
from the legislative agenda.2 7 After a milder version of the penal code
amendments was passed in December of 1996, President Michal Kovac
again vetoed the measure in light of continued opposition and the bill has
since failed to gather sufficient support in Parliament to override the
presidential veto.-
The freedoms of speech, assembly, and expression are deeply
embedded principles of democracy and are codified in numerous
international human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights proclaims that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, . . . the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, . . . the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association. "9 These rights are also recognized in the ECHR (Articles 9
through 11), and the CCPR (Articles 18, 19, 21, and 22). These
established rights are also referenced with particular regard to national
minorities. FCNM Article 9 specifically discusses the right of freedom of
expression held by persons belonging to a national minority. This right is
to be exercised "without interference by public authorities and regardless
of frontiers." 290 If passed without substantial alterations, the Law on the
Protection of the Republic will inhibit many forms of democratic political
demonstrations and manifestations.
While the protection of freedom of speech, assembly, and
expression is a concern for all members of Slovak society, it is particularly
crucial for ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians who are perceived as a
political threat. It is unclear under these provisions whether actions such
as a public manifestation or the call for the resignation of the Prime
Minister by a Hungarian political party could be construed as an "effort to
subvert the constitutional system." While this analysis is somewhat
premature given the uncertain future of this legislation,2 9' examination is
286. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliamentary Chairman Defends Controversial Legislation,
205 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Oct. 22, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/
publications/DD /index.Dhtml>.
287. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Withdraws Penal Code Amendment, II, 208 OMRI
DAILY DIG (Oct. 25, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml >.
288. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Rejects Penal Code Amendment, 30 OMRI DAILY
DIG (Feb. 12, 1997) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml>.
289. See supra note 132.
290. See FCNM supra note 71, art. 9(1).
291. On December 17, 1996, the penal code amendment was again passed by the Slovak
Parliament. Although this measure omitted the penalty for "spread[ing] false information
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prospective in the event that a majority of the Slovak Parliament believes
that such legislation is necessary. 29
D. Slovakia 's Prospects for EU and NATO Accession
The Slovak government has been actively pursuing admission into
the EU and NATO since the state's inception in 1993. Slovakia became a
member of the Visegrad Club, four states considered to be next in line for
EU membership, and had the outspoken ambition to become a member of
NATO. Following secession from Czechoslovakia, the Slovak government
set out to establish good relations with its neighboring states in an effort to
gain Western favor. Within the framework of the European Stability Pact,
Slovakia negotiated treaties on friendly relations and cooperation with four
of its neighbors, the Czech Republic, the Ukraine, Hungary, and Poland.
Despite these advancements, the coalition government has not proven its
commitment to basic democratic principles.
The reluctance of the Slovak Republic to form a dependable
alliance with its southern neighbor, together with disrespect of its
Hungarian minority, centralization efforts, slow and questionable
privatization methods, 29 and an unproven economy count among the
possible reasons why Slovakia should slip on the list of countries next in
line for entry into the EU, NATO, and other western-oriented
abroad," opposition and trade representatives protested the law, claiming the measure continued
to infringe upon basic freedoms. Mr. Jan Slota, Chairman of the SNS, stated that he was "very
happy" with the measure's passage and asserted that the "integrity of the young Slovakia is
jeopardized by some representatives of the Hungarian coalition and opposition." Slovak
President Michal Kovac vetoed the controversial law on the protection of the republic on Dec.
31, 1996. Since this time, the amendments have not gained sufficient support to pass through the
Slovak Parliament. See Sharon Fisher, Opposition Protests Slovak Penal Code Amendment, 243
OMRI DAILY DIG II, (Dec. 18, 1996); See also Sharon Fisher, Slovak President Vetoes Penal
Code Amendment, 1 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Jan. 2, 1997) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
•http://www.omri.CZ/publications /DD/index.Dhtml; Sharon Fisher, Slovak Parliament Rejects
Penal Code Amendment, 30 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Feb. 12, 1997) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
292. On July 20, 1996, the Central Board of the SNS held a meeting in Zilina where it
promised to use all legislative possibilities to re-debate the anti-subversion law. See generally
SNS Wants to Re-debate Amended Penal Code in Parliament, DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, July
20, 1996, at 2.
293. On November 21, the Slovak Constitutional Court held that legislation transferring
control over privatization from the government to the National Property Fund was illegal. The
National Property Fund had been criticized for selling state property through direct sales,
frequently at prices well below market value. Sales were largely kept secret. Under the 1994
legislation, the government, the Supreme Supervisory Office and the courts had no control over
the National Property Fund. All of the board members of the National Property Fund were
representatives of the ruling government coalition. See Sharon Fisher, Slovak Constitutional
Court Rules on Privatization, 227 OMRI DAILY DIG. II (Nov. 22, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28,
1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>.
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organizations. Political stability in Slovakia was seriously jeopardized in
the summer of 1996 when HZDS coalition partners threatened to leave the
partnership over disputes for control of the country's largest state
insurance company, Slovenska Poistovna. The SNS and the Association of
Slovak Workers threatened to derail the country's privatization process
after their supporters were purged from Slovenska Poistovna's board of
directors. The crisis was resolved when HZDS made concessions granting
one opposition parliament member a position on the parliamentary
commission that supervises the Slovak Intelligence Service. Demands have
also been made to put opposition members on the parliamentary
committees governing television and radio, something EU officials have
stressed for some time.2 14 "A strong government in a strong democracy
needs a strong opposition," asserted Mr. Werner Hoyer, plenipotentiary
for EU matters, on his visit to Slovakia in June of 1996.29 The
government's unwillingness to tolerate political dissent continues to be a
frequently voiced concern of many Western diplomats.
Slovakia currently possesses the status of an associate member of
the EU29 and has completed the EU's questionnaire, both of which are
prerequisites for the upcoming EU expansion scheduled to begin in 1998.19,
Slovakia's future membership in the EU, however, is in jeopardy.
Criticism of the coalition government's policies and practices have come
from numerous sources. EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans van der
Broek called on Slovakia to "further develop and strengthen democratic
institutions and to respect ethnic minority rights and freedom of speech."i9,
Since Prime Minister Meciar won elections in 1994, the EU has delivered
two diplomatic notes warning of the need for observance of human and
political rights. 2" The United States has also issued a demarche urging the
294. See Jan Stojaspal, Slovak Coalition Moves Past Crisis, THE PRAGUE POST, July 3 - 9,
1996, at 1.
295. Jana Dorotkova, Kohl's Remarks Sour Slovakia's Supposedly Sweet Day, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31- Aug. 13, 1996, at 2.
296. See PAVOL BURAK, ET AL., SLOVAKIA IN THE WORLD, THE WORLD IN SLOVAKIA
(1994).
297. See generally Individual Talks With Candidates for EU Amalgamation in 1998, DAILY
NEWS MONITOR/TASR, July 19, 1996, at 2.
298. 42 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Feb. 28, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)
http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml. (quoted in DAILY NEWS MONIToR/TASR
FEB. 27, 1996). Van der Broek also expressed that he hoped Slovakia would soon pass
legislation on minority languages, cancel its 10% import surcharge, show more openness to
foreign investment, close unsafe nuclear reactors, and harmonize its legislation with that of the
EU.
299. European Parliament, European Parliament, Resolution on the need to respect human
and democratic rights in the Slovak Republic, Nov. 16, 1995; See also EU/Slovakia: Van Den
Broek Visits Bratislava But Not Meciar, MONTHLY REP. ON EUR., No. 137, Mar. 1, 1996.
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government to put a greater emphasis on the toleration of diverse opinions.
United States Ambassador Ralph Johnson recently stated that if Slovakia
sought admission into the EU and NATO, the state must be democratic
"not only in its electoral process, but also in its laws, their implementation,
and its preservation of individuals rights, including the right to disagree
without being considered an enemy of the state. '"0 German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl also questioned Slovakia's chances of early admission into
the EU stating that he "deeply regret[s] that Slovakia's internal
development is very harmful with regard to [early EU admission]. 3 °I
Chancellor Kohl also added that Slovakia's chances "have not gotten
better, they've gotten worse." 2
Despite Western criticism, support for EU integration continues to
rise among the Slovak public. A December 1995 poll revealed that 59.4%
of Slovak citizens supported EU integration, up from 58.8% in June
1995.303 Slovakia's efforts to be among the first former communist nations
to join the EU have been impeded by tensions between ethnic Hungarians
and Slovaks, Bratislava and Budapest. These tensions have not been
placated by ratification of the SHBT as EU officials had hoped.
NATO accession has also been imperiled by actions of the
coalition government. The United States recently delivered a severe blow
to Slovakia's chances of admission into NATO by refusing to include the
country on a list of new democracies to be given $60,000,000 in financial
aid to facilitate NATO enlargement.- Prime Minister Meciar explained on
Slovak Radio on July 26, 1996 that Slovakia's omission could partly be
attributed to the "many untruths [being] said about us abroad."0" Prime
Minister Meciar dismissed the United States' position, asserting that the
absence of Slovakia's inclusion on the congressional resolution was not on
account of Slovakia's internal political situation, but rather because the
nation's housing accommodations and shopping facilities do not meet the
standards of the generals' wives 306 NATO membership is contingent upon
improvements in Slovakia's respect for democratic values, respect for
300. Sharon Fisher, United States, EU Call for More Democracy in Slovakia, 206 OMRI
DAILY DIG. II, (Oct. 23, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml>.
301. See generally SNS on Kohl's Remarks on ORF, DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, July
18, 1996, at 4.
302. Jana Dorotkova, Kohl's Remarks Sour Slovakia's Supposedly Sweet Day, THE SLOVAK
SPECTATOR, July 31-Aug. 13, 1996, at 2.
303. See generally DAILY NEWS MONITOR/TASR, Jan. 10, 1996.
304. Ben Barber, Slovakia Ignored as NATO Grows, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at A14.
305. Tom Hundley, Slovakia's Shifty Leader Irritates the West, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1996,
at 4.
306. Id.
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human rights, and the protection of minorities. One survey found support
for Slovakia's entry into NATO among Slovaks to be 42.5%, up from
38.5% in June of 1996. However, opposition to integration was also
significant and surveyed at 21.9%. " A United States congressional aid
asserted that Slovakia is subject to heightened scrutiny as one of the first
post-communist states being considered for NATO membership.M
Entering the alliance is contingent upon the state's ability to settle
neighborly disputes and domestic conflicts.309
Despite the steady increase in public support, opposition members
of Parliament have questioned whether the government truly desires
Western integration. Slovakia occupies a strategically significant segment
of Europe being located between the expanding West and the newly
democratic Soviet states and Russia. If Hungary, the Czech Republic and
Poland join NATO as expected, Slovakia will abut the western alliance's
eastern frontier, sandwiched between the amalgamated additions. One
possible reason for Slovak resistance to Western integration is that it may
threaten Slovakia's relations with Russia. Slovakia and Russia are
substantial trading partners, with Russia ranking second in terms of
imports to Slovakia and seventh in.terms of Slovakia's exports. 10 Failure
to construct a comprehensive program to fulfill EU and NATO accession
requirements, coupled with the government unwillingness to accept the
terms of integration, have provoked scepticism. MKDH Chairman Bela
Bugar assessed that "[w]hen it comes to foreign policy or foreign
integration, all the parliamentary groups should represent the same
interests. There is no consensus but they have not even tried to make
consensus in this field.""' Prime Minister Meciar, in the Russian daily
Trud, stated that the aim of Slovak foreign policy was to balance its
relations with the East and the West. He asserted that western integration
would not force the Slovak government to "unconditionally agree with the
West on everything." 1 2  Despite speculation, Prime Minister Meciar
307. See generally SME, Jan. 12, 1996.
308. James Morrison, Selling Slovakia, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1996, at A17.
309. Id.
310. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Prime Minister on Relations with Russia, 196 OMRI DAILY DIG
II (Oct. 9, 1996)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml>. A free trade
agreement with Russia is currently being prepared and should be signed by late June 1997. See
Sharon Fisher, Slovakia, Russia Strengthen Ties, 229 OMRI DAILY DIG II (Nov. 26, 1996) (last
visited Oct. 28, 1997) < http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.Dhtml >.
311. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
312. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Prime Minister on Relations with Russia, 196 OMRI DAILY DIG.
II, (Oct. 9, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications
/DD/index.Dhtml>.
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continues to profess the ultimate goal of NATO expansion. He blamed his
opposition for the current questioning by the international community
about the prospects of Slovakia entering NATO among the first wave of
new post-Cold War democracies. The Prime Minister also accused
"certain individuals, who are driven by their personal traumas" of sending
negative information about the state abroad and thereby threatening
Slovakia's chances for early integration."' HZDS supports a public
referendum on NATO and EU membership. Such a measure is prompted
by the frequent questioning of the benefits of Western integration posed by
HZDS junior coalition partners, the SNS and the Association of Slovak
Workers .14
In the event that Slovakia is denied admission to both the EU and
NATO while its neighbors accede to Western integration, minority rights
in Slovakia could be further threatened. The ethnic Hungarian minority
may become increasingly vulnerable because of the following reasons: 1)
the government coalition will no longer have Western pressure to adhere to
international human rights standards; 2) the country will be somewhat
alienated by the West and may further solidify its eastern allegiances; and'
3) politicians may attempt to use the Hungarian minority as a scapegoat in
the event of the state's denial of EU and NATO admission. Many
Hungarian political leaders have already made these predictions. Mr.
Bugar stated:
[iut is possible that if Slovakia is not integrated into the
West, and the internal economic situation continues to
worsen, members of the SNS or HZDS will try to escalate
tensions between ethnic Hungarians and Slovaks in an
attempt to distract attention away from the real issues, such
as a failed economic policy. It is in our [ethnic Hungarian]
interests to be integrated into the EU and NATO. . . . If
we are integrated, this means that we have fulfilled the five
basic requirements of NATO, one of which is solving the
minority issue .... This is what we want.'"
This sentiment prompted over 500 ethnic Hungarians to converge on the
town of Komarno in southern Slovakia to announce an open letter to EU
313. See Jiri Pehe, Slovak Prime Minister on NATO, EU, 200 OMRI DAILY DIG. II, (Oct.
15, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index.DhtmI>.
314. See Sharon Fisher, Slovakia Plans Referendum on EU, NATO, 208 OMRI DAILY DIG.
II, (Oct. 25, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publirations/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
315. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, MKDH Chairman, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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and NATO countries entitled, Democracy is Endangered which highlighted
questionable measures of the Slovak government. 1'6 Statements like this
prompted the government to accuse Hungarians of spreading
disinformation abroad, thereby jeopardizing Slovakia's chances of
integration.
It is clear that Slovakia has not attained the democratic threshold
necessary to permit the state's accession into the EU and NATO. This
conclusion is supported by the government's relentless control over media
institutions, its questionable privatization methods, its disrespect for
national minorities, and its failure to stabilize relations with Hungary. If
Slovakia is hastily integrated into NATO, a revision of the Turkish-Greek
conflict is possible. While the SHBT is a significant step towards placating
tensions between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, it should only be
considered one step down the rocky path toward building a friendly and
trusting alliance. The Slovak government must adhere to its present
obligations under international human rights law to protect its minority
groups. Until the Slovak government sets the tone for tolerance, rather
than division, towards the Hungarian minority, it is unlikely that a positive
relationship between Slovakia and Hungary will be secured.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The historical context underlying present relations between the
Hungarian minority and the Slovak majority has resulted in an exaggerated
awareness of the need to safeguard Slovak ethnicity in the young republic.
Protection of the Slovak nation is a sensitive and important government
prerogative. The Slovak government's authority to take measures to
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity is not questioned. These
interests, however, must be balanced by protections for all Slovak citizens
regardless of nationality. The legislative measures analyzed in this report
have furthered the interests of ethnic Slovaks while leaving persons
belonging to a national minority vulnerable. Such initiatives are contrary
to the letter and spirit of international agreements ratified by the Slovak
government. As a multi-ethnic state, the Slovak government must resist
urges to place the Slovak nation before the interests of national minority
groups residing within its borders. All Slovak citizens must be treated in a
fair and equitable manner.
Ethnic problems arise when individuals are discriminated against,
denied their freedom of expression, or prohibited from exercising their
cultural and linguistic practices. The Slovak government, while ratifying
316. Sharon Fisher, Slovak Hungarians Complain to EU, NATO, 194 OMRI DAILY DIG. II
(Oct. 7, 1996) (last visited Oct. 28, 1997)<http://www.omri.CZ/publications/DD/index
.Dhtml >.
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international instruments aimed at securing the rights of minorities on the
one hand, is simultaneously taking steps that increase ethnic tensions with
the other. The government's willingness, on occasion, to manipulate
ethnic tensions for political gain has cast doubt on its commitment to
protect minority rights. Legislation restricting the use of the Hungarian
language, decreasing support for Hungarian language education and
cultural activities, and disrupting local representation in political life has
resulted in resentment and discord among the Hungarian minority.
It must not be forgotten that as the Slovak government struggles to
build a national identity from heterogeneous elements, the selection of a
state language may be an important symbol and a practical necessity.
From the point of view of the Hungarian minority, however, the selection
of the Slovak language as the state language places members of the
minority at a distinct disadvantage. It seems incumbent upon the state to
ensure that this disadvantage is eliminated as far as possible. Language is
the primary feature that unites the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. While
uniting members of the Hungarian minority, language may also prove to be
extremely divisive as it pits Slovak speakers against those whose mother
tongue is Hungarian. Disrespect for minority languages has fanned the
centuries-old flames of discontent, and language, unfortunately, has
become the rallying cry for ethnic tension.
Many of the problems analyzed in this report may be attributed to
weak drafting skills or lack of precedents that in due course will fill out the
lacunae. Legal and institutional protection for the rights of minorities in
Slovakia remain weak, specifically, the fragility of democratic institutions
and the constitutionally-based rule of law generally. The Slovak
government has promised that other laws are forthcoming, albeit at a
modest pace, that may modify the contents of the legislation in question.
In light of nationalistic tendencies prevalent in Slovakia, recently
promulgated legislation presents a disquieting picture of Slovak. life.
Rather than implementing the philosophies of decentralization and
transfrontier cooperation, antediluvian notions such as continued
centralization of state power and disrespect for the value of national
minorities continue to dominate Slovak political life. If the ruling coalition
truly strives to integrate into both the EU and NATO, extensive effort
needs to be made to resolve domestic disputes. Efforts need to be made
not only in the arena of minority relations, but also in all areas of society
where conflicting opinions arise.
The Slovak government must abide by its obligations under
international and national law to protect the human rights of members of
the Hungarian minority, specifically, to:
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1) Respect the Hungarian minority's constitutionally guaranteed
rights, contained in Article 34, to "promote their cultural heritage,"
"receive and disseminate information in their mother tongues, form
associations, and create and maintain educational and cultural institutions,"
"be educated in a minority language," "use a minority language in official
contacts," and "participate in decision making in matters affecting" them.
These constitutional rights should not be limited, restricted or eradicated
by domestic legislation, as the free exercise of these rights does not
threaten Slovak sovereignty or territorial integrity;
2) Promulgate legislation, as promised, defining the permissible use
of minority languages in the Slovak Republic. This measure should be in
accordance with the state's obligations under the SHBT, Recommendation
1201, the FCNM and the ECHR. In light of the geographical
concentration of the Hungarian minority in southern Slovakia, special
consideration should be given to the use of the Hungarian language in
administrative contacts throughout this region. This accommodation will
protect members of the Hungarian minority from possible discriminatory
effects caused by the Language Law's prohibition on the use of minority
languages in this context;
3) Establish a commission, comprised of minority representatives, to
monitor the implementation of the Language Law to guarantee that its
provisions are not fulfilled in a discriminatory manner;
4) Modify its alternative education plan to ensure that acceptance of
bilingual education is truly voluntary;
5) Support, facilitate and provide for education in the Hungarian
language, an adequate number of classes for Hungarian students at all
levels, ensure that teachers are properly-trained to teach in the Hungarian
language; and enable a sufficient number of Hungarian students to attend
the Nitra Pedagogical College to receive teacher training;
6) Develop a program aimed at increasing minority enrollment in
universities;
7) Amend legislation authorizing the government appointment of
district administrators and the district's state administration board to allow
for the election of these local representatives;
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8) Amend the territorial division legislation to more adequately
decentralize government control of local affairs and increase the
participation of the Hungarian minority in government. These amendments
should reflect suggestions contained in the Explanatory Report to the
FCNM, the European Charter of Self-Government and the CRLAE
Recommendation 250;
9) Respect the use of traditional Hungarian Christian names;
10) Respect the posting of bilingual public signs, especially signs
indicating historic place names;
11) Allocate spending on minority culture in a proportional and non-
discriminatory manner;
12) Reduce the statutory mandates on financial thresholds created by
the Law on Foundations to better facilitate growth in this sector;
13) Make substantial changes to the Law on the Protection of the
Republic to ensure that the freedoms of speech, association and expression
are protected in accordance with international human rights principles;
14) Adopt an affirmative plan. to recruit more members of the
Hungarian minority into government positions to ensure the adequate and
fair representation of all Slovak citizens. This recommendation is
particularly important in the ministries of Education and Culture;
15) Allow members of the Hungarian Coalition access to parliamentary
committees, particularly the committee on radio and television, state
security, and culture;
16) Strengthen legal mechanisms for protecting the legal rights of the
Hungarian minority, including making revisions, where necessary, to
facilitate the ability of citizens to challenge government decisions,
including those of local authorities;
17) Implement an educational program for judges aimed at
incorporating international human rights standards into court decisions;
18) Take additional measures to guarantee the independence of the
judiciary;
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19) Take affirmative actions to reduce tensions between minorities and
the Slovak majority. Efforts should be made to introduce educational
programs on minority rights, minority history and culture, and human
rights standards. Human rights training programs should be provided for
the police, government officials, local authorities, and teachers;
20) Establish a commission, comprised of government, opposition and
minority representatives, to investigate anonymous threats, and physical
and verbal harassment to journalists and opposition political leaders;
21) Abandon its attempts to deprive democratically elected officials of
their positions;
22) Refrain from misusing its authority to replace political opponents
with government sympathizers; and
23) Distance itself from extremist views, whether they be nationalist,
xenophobic, or anti-Hungarian.
It is incumbent upon the Slovak government to set the tone of
respect for members of national minorities. Rather than provoke ethnic
division and unrest, the Slovak government should serve as a model for a
tolerant and civil atmosphere. Claims of Hungarian irredentism should not
be used to vilify the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Territorial claims
have repeatedly been refuted by the Hungarian government. In addition,
representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia have repeatedly
stated that they do not want to reunify with Hungary. What ethnic
Hungarians do want is the right to live free from discrimination in
Slovakia. In closing, Mr. Bugar's words are appropriate:
We only want the right to remain Hungarian. This is the
ethnicity and language of our parents, grandparents and
great-grandparents. Hungarians in this region have a very
good habit which has worked for centuries. The more they
beat us, the more we protect ourselves and organize to
resist their attacks. [Many people] fear this situation now.
There is an old Hungarian idiom: You can't catch a
sparrow with a gun. This holds true for us now. 17
317. Interview with Mr. Bela Bugar, Chairman of MKDH, in Bratislava, Slovakia (Aug. 1,
1996).
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